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I. INTRODUCTION
Progressive taxation-taxing high income individuals at a
proportionally higher level than low income individuals-has sparked

Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. I owe thanks to
Guyora Binder, Susan Cahn, Markus Dubber, Barbara Fried, Barry Friedman, Estelle Lau,
Ronald Mann, Jack Schlegel, Amartya Sen, Rob Steinfeld, Mariam Thalos, and the participants
at the Columbia Law School Feminist Legal Theory Workshop and the SUNY-Buffalo Faculty
Workshop for their insights on various drafts of this Article.
*
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more than a century of controversy.1 Those who support progressive
taxation have heralded it as a policy that promotes the greatest good
for the greatest number in society, 2 protects traditional democratic
values, 3 reflects the communitarian world-view of women who see
themselves as responsible for the well-being of all individuals, 4 and
reveals the "aesthetic judgment" that income inequality is "distinctly
evil or unlovely."5 At the same time, critics have condemned progressive income taxation as social policy that amounts to theft and involuntary servitude,6 reflects the democratic process gone awry,7 penal-

1.
Progressive taxation can be implemented in a number of ways. For example,
progressivity could be administered through ever-increasing marginal tax rates or a so-called
degressive system in which low-income individuals are exempt and all others pay at flat or even
declining rates. Importantly, few, if any, theorists oppose progressivity per se-rather, the
debate centers on the proper rate structure for implementing the system. While the level of the
rates is subject to debate, their coercive nature has not been the subject of extensive criticism in
the legal literature. Coercive taxation has largely been accepted because of free-rider and assurance problems. But see Michael Meurer, Private Provision of a Public Good in a Finitely
Repeated Game (unpublished manuscript) (exploring the provision of public goods through
voluntary systems of payments). If voluntary payments by individual citizens were adequate to
supply the desired level of public goods and services, there would be no need for coercive
taxation. Because it is impossible (or uneconomical) to exclude individuals from consuming the
benefits of public goods, individuals will seek to gain the benefits of public goods, or free-ride, on
the contributions made by others. Although, some individuals may not free-ride, they might
nevertheless fear that a large number of free-riders will prevent the production of the goods and
services they desire. Thus, coercive taxation insures against the potential problems associated
with free-riders. See David Schmidtz, The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods
Argument 54-79 (Westview Press, 1991) (arguing that unanimous assurance contracts combined
with an effective contractual enforcement mechanism would solve both the assurance and freerider problems). See also Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the
Theory of Groups 14 n.21 (Harvard U., 1971) (distinguishing between a public good and collective good). The difficulty with granting the state the power to tax has revolved around the
question of how best to allocate the cost of public goods throughout society.
2.
See, for example, Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate
Structure"A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1905, 1945-58 (1987) (arguing a
utilitarian calculus calls for progressive taxation). See also Edwin Seligman, Progressive
Taxation in Theory and Practice285-90 (Princeton U., 1908) (providing historical background on
early utilitarian arguments).
The
3.
See Ronald Frederick King, From Redistributive to Hegemonic Logic:
Transformation of American Tax Politics, 1894-1963, 12 Pol. & Soc. 1, 10-11 (1983) (quoting
Populist rhetoric and discussing the nature of its impact on tax policy).
4.
Marjorie Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A
Typical Male Reaction, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 504-18 (1987) (arguing that cultural feminists
would approve of progressive taxation). But see William Turnier, Pamela Johnston Conover,
and David Lowery, Redistributive Justiceand CulturalFeminism, 45 Am.L. Rev. 1275, 1315-18
(1996) (arguing that empirical data indicates that gender and feminism have only a modest
impact on one's support for redistribution through progressive taxation).
Henry Simons, PersonalIncome Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of
5.
FiscalPolicy 18-19 (U. of Chicago, 1938).
6.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 169 (Basic Books, 1974).
7.
Walter Blum and Harry Kalven, The Uneasy Case for ProgressiveTaxation 19-20 (U.
of Chicago, 1953) (noting that progressivity is partly the result of an irresponsible majority
imposing the costs of public goods on the wealthy minority).
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izes hard-working individuals, 8 and produces economic waste
throughout society.9 Theorists in almost every discipline have entered
the progressivity debate, proposing a variety of different tax rates in
order to disburse the costs of public goods and services.
Despite their contending viewpoints, theorists on both sides of
the debate have reached surprising consensus on the proper treatment of the truly poor. Both sides agree that legislators and policymakers must avoid imposing tax costs on individuals living at or below subsistence levels of income. 0 This agreement is notable in light

8. Dan Troop Smith, High ProgressiveTax Rates: Inequity and Immorality?, 20 U. Fla.
L. Rev. 451, 456 (1968) (asserting that by progressively reducing the net return from any given
increment of gross income or gain, progressive taxation discourages additional efforts or
activities).
9. William Vickrey, The Problem of Progression,20 U. Fla. L. Rev. 437, 442 (1968) (stating
that, given tax preferences, progressivity encourages individuals to invest in government bonds
and wasteful private activities).
10. The list is literally endless. See, for example, Seligman, ProgressiveTaxation at 79-80,
129-30 (cited in note 2) (noting that benefit and faculty theorists argued that taxation should be
imposed on property in excess of that necessary for minimum subsistence); Andrew Mellon,
Taxation: The People's Business 55 (MacMillan, 1924) (proposing income tax that exempts the
truly poor from taxation); Simons, Personal Income Taxation at 137, 141 (cited in note 5)
(advocating exemption for the costs associated with raising dependents); Harold Groves, Toward
a Social Theory of ProgressiveTaxation, 9 Natl Tax J. 27, 32-33 (1956) (noting that defenders
and critics of progressivity are willing to allow a personal exemption for biological necessities
and arguing that the exemption is warranted in light of the strong social interest in enabling an
individual to meet her social responsibilities); Michael Graetz, The 1982 Minimum Tax
Amendments as a First Step in the Transition to a "Flat-Rate"Tax, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 527, 533
(1983) (advocating a flat tax with an exemption for low income individuals); William Andrews, A
Supplemental Personal Expenditure Tax, in Joseph Pechman, ed., What Should Be Taxed:Income or Expenditure? 127, 129 (Brookings Institute, 1980) (arguing that an expenditure tax
should be phased in with an exemption of about $20-25,000); Smith, 20 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 462-63
(cited in note 8) (noting that progressive rates that exempt the poor from taxation appeal to an
"intuitive sense of fairness" but anything beyond that is deeply problematic); Richard
Doernberg, A Workable Flat Rate Consumption Tax, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 425, 431 (1985) (advocating
a tax that exempts the poorest families from taxation altogether and a small tax for low-income
families); Charles O'Kelly, Tax Policy for Post-LiberalSociety: A Flat-Tax-InspiredRedefinition
of the Purpose and the Ideal Structure of a Progressive Income Tax, 58 S.Cal. L. Rev. 727, 744751 (1985) (advocating a personal exemption equal to the minimum wage, which is perceived to
be necessary to keep an individual out of poverty); Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka, The Flat
Tax 91 (Hoover Institute Press, 2d. ed 1995) (proposing a flat tax with an exemption for income
up to $25,500 for a family of four); Jeffrey Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A
Considerationof the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 Am. J. Tax
Policy 221, 270 (1995) (proposing a head tax with a "degressive rate structure to account for
those at a subsistence or lower level" of income); Alan Feld, Fairness in Rate Cuts in the
Individual Income Tax, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 429, 433-41 (1983) (analyzing historical changes in
the tax laws and noting the permanent, though ever-fluctuating, personal exemption and zero
bracket levels implemented by Congress). See also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 278
(Harvard U., 1971) (indicating that the taxation system should allow "the usual exemptions for
dependents, and so on"); Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 169-70, 265-68 (cited in note 6)
(noting that most people envisage "something like a proportional tax on everything above the
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of the widespread perception that advocates of progressivity worry
about the poor while its detractors worry about the wealthy."
In fact, all tax theorists have divided society into two
groups-relatively wealthy individuals who pay taxes and poor
individuals who are excluded from the face of the laws entirely. Of
course, if the goal of tax policy is to distribute the costs of public
goods, then offering an exemption to the poor might seem desirable
and perhaps even an obvious policy choice, given that the poor have
little or no income. While the practical difficulty of collecting the tax
explains why theorists have advocated an exemption, it does not explain why they have failed to explore any positive rights beyond an
exemption or, indeed, any responsibility the poor might have to society despite their lack of income.
In this Article, I argue that.by reaching the agreement that the
poor should have no tax liability, the contest over progressivity has
centered improperly on the rights and responsibilities of relatively
wealthy citizens. The wealthy are widely perceived to have valuable
property that, if shared with society, will enable the smooth operation
of the democratic state. 2 At the same time, the wealthy are perceived
to have liberty interests, which if violated, could lead to the ruin of
13
the domestic economy.
Although the debate over progressivity has lasted for more
than a century, traditional tax theorists have limited their discussion
to the negative rights of the poor and have never explored fully any
positive rights the poor might have. Moreover, theorists have ignored
completely any responsibilities the poor might have with regard to the
state. Traditional tax theorists, for example, have never investigated
in any detail the question of whether poor individuals have a right to
basic needs and economic security simply because of their status as
citizens.' 4 Theorists also have failed to explore the idea that the poor
amount necessary for basic needs" and arguing that it does not go far enough to eradicate the
coercive aspects of the system).
11. Alternatively, some identify the debate as one of efficiency versus fairness. See, for

example, Arthur Okin, The Political Economy of Prosperity 12 (Brookings Institution, 1970)
("Taxation is a key to linking equity and efficiency.").

12.

Schmidtz, The Limits of Government at 1-2 (cited in note 1) (stating that by paying for

public goods and services, individuals advance the common good and contribute to a well-

ordered society).
13. Barry P. Bosworth, Tax Incentives and Economic Growth 9-12 (Brookings Institute,
1984) (noting that market growth and productivity depend on individual incentives to work and
invest, and stating that taxation often provides a disincentive to engage in these activities).
14. Three British economists have explored the possibility that the legislature should
accord more than an exemption from taxation to the poor. See generally James A. Mirlees, An
Explorationin the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. 175 (1971) (arguing
that maximizing the social welfare function under a utilitarian ethic calls for a tax structure
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might have a social duty to contribute their talents and energies to
the greater social good despite their lack of income. Indeed, the poor
are viewed as having nothing of value to contribute to society. Many
political, moral, and economic theorists have argued, however, that
access to rights as well as fulfillment of duties are necessary
components of one's full membership in a community. Accordingly, I
argue that by drawing lines and divisions between taxpayers and
nontaxpayers, traditional tax theorists have enabled relatively
wealthy individuals to participate in society as full citizens. At the
same time, the lines have virtually bound the poor to a subordinate
position in society.
This Article begins by placing the progressivity debate within
the broader context of tax fairness. Part II examines the underlying
concepts of horizontal and vertical equity, the two standards that tax
theorists have devised to test the fairness of the tax laws. In this
that awards a cash transfer to the poor); N.H. Stern, On the Specification of Models of Optimum
Income Taxation, 6 J. Pub. Econ. 123 (1976) (arguing that maximizing the social welfare
function under a Rawlsian ethic calls for the tax structure to award a cash transfer to the poor);
A.B. Atkinson, Public Economics in Action: The Basic Income/Flat Tax Proposal (Clarendon
Press, 1995) (exploring the possibility of insuring basic subsistence income for all individuals
under a variety of theories). While these authors make an important contribution to the tax
literature, they fail to explore in any detail the specific rights of the poor. Moreover, each of the
authors entirely ignore the notion that the poor might have some level of responsibility to the
state. As I argue in the text, most American tax theorists have failed to recognize the
importance of the work of Mirlees, Stern, and Atkinson-and those who have are subject to the
same criticisms. See notes 77-80 (discussing the work of Joseph bankman and Thomas Griffith).
Section 32 of the Code, the provision that provides an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to
poor individuals who work in the waged labor market, begins to reflect legislative consideration
of both the rights and responsibilities of the poor. While this provision is a welcome advancement to the one-sided debate on the rights and responsibilities of the wealthy, it cannot be
argued that this single provision has dramatically shifted the century long focus on the wealthy
to a new focus on the poor. See Lawrence Mead, Beyond Entitlement. The Social Obligationsof
Citizenship 2 (Free Press, 1986) (noting that welfare programs are planned and studied by
economists who seldom address the issue of rights and responsibilities). In fact, very little has
been written on the provision in the legal literature and most of the articles that have explored
the EITC have addressed the mechanics of the provision and its shortcomings, rather than its
ability to include the poor into the society as full and valuable members. See, for example,
Stacy Dickert, Scott Houser, and J. Karl Scholz, The EarnedIncome Tax Credit and Transfer
Programs: A Study of Labor Market and Program Participation,in James Poterba, ed., 9 Tax
Policy and the Economy 1-50 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995) (exploring the
determinants of transfer program participation); Ann Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit
and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 545-89 (1995)
(exploring the work and marriage incentives found within the structure of the EITC as well as
the problems associated with inaccuracy, unresponsiveness, and noncompliance); George K. Yin,
Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the EarnedIncome
Tax Credit Program,11 Am. J. Tax Pol. 225, 230 (1994) (noting that the goals of the program
are both distributional and behavioral, but failing to explore them). See also Part III.B.3 for a
more detailed discussion of the provision and its relationship to the rights and responsibilities of
the poor.
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Part, I argue that empirical and normative difficulties with horizontal
equity (treating likes alike) have reduced the concept to a largely
useless principle for tax policymaking. The controversy over fairness
thus has centered on vertical equity, or the notion that the tax laws
should distinguish between individuals in divergent economic
circumstances. The concept of vertical equity, of course, raises the
question of the relevant characteristics upon which to base differential treatment. Tax scholars have debated extensively the basis upon
which distinctions, if any, should be made, using social contract
theory, welfarist theories of distributive justice, and entitlement
theories of property. These theories, in turn, have led tax theorists to
propose a number of different marginal tax rate schedules ranging
from the steeply progressive to the steeply regressive. Despite the
number of tax reform proposals grounded on extremely diverse principles and ethical mandates, I note that tax theorists have spoken in
almost perfect unison with regard to the proper treatment of the truly
poor. 15 All have taken the position that the tax laws should avoid
imposing a burden upon those individuals living at or below subsistence levels of income.
In Part III, I seek to uncover the various underlying
assumptions that have led tax theorists to advocate such a limited
policy with regard to the rights of the poor. In this Part, I explore
three possible justifications for tax theorists' narrow focus on the
poor's negative right to noninterference by the state. I argue that
theorists cannot justify their analytically incomplete approach to
taxation. I also argue that the traditional approach imposes a
number of hidden costs upon society in general and poor individuals
in particular.
Finally, in Part IV, I examine the costs of traditional tax
theorists' failure to explore the idea that all individuals, including the
poor, have responsibilities to the state. I argue that both rights and
responsibilities are linked to one's ability to participate in society as a
full citizen. Although the poor have no economic resources to contribute, many political theorists outside the taxation debates have considered the importance of community involvement, education, and waged
labor to an individual's membership in the community. Indeed, many
have argued that the inability to fulfill these community obligations
or to maintain some level of civic virtue is as much an obstacle to full
membership in society as the lack of equal rights. By failing to investigate the possibility that poor individuals have responsibilities to the
15.

See notes 77-80 for a discussion of the limited exception to this general rule.
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state, I argue that traditional tax theorists have contributed to the
exclusion of the poor from political and social institutions.
Accordingly, I explore the possibility of expanding the existing tax
structure in an effort to develop a tax-based system of obligations for
the truly poor.
II. FAIRNESS IN TAXATION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPT

The traditional means for measuring the fairness of the federal
tax laws involves examining the allocation of the tax burden under
two distinct standards. Scholars and policymakers view the tax laws
as fair if they impose similar economic burdens on similarly situated
individuals (horizontal fairness) yet at the same time make appropriate distinctions between individuals in dissimilar economic circumstances (vertical fairness). When closely examined, however, the two
notions of equity play very different roles in tax policymaking. The
principle of horizontal fairness is riddled with practical and normative
difficulties that make it a largely useless standard upon which to base
tax policy. Indeed, while horizontal fairness has engendered very
little debate,16 vertical fairness has excited substantial controversy in
the tax literature, in legislative debates, and in the popular culture.
In this Part, I first explore the limitations of horizontal equity and
then explore the debate that has developed around vertical fairness,
and in particular, the progressive marginal rate structure.
A. HorizontalEquity
Horizontal equity is simply the command that taxpayers in
similar economic circumstances be treated similarly under the Tax
Code. This notion of fairness is perceived not only to offer protection
against arbitrary discrimination under the laws but it also reflects the
basic principles of equal worth found in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.7 As a number of
16. Although tax theorists have not completely ignored the concept, it has played more of
a rhetorical than a substantive role. This seems to be especially true in the tax literature published since the time that Barbara Fried and Louis Kaplow published their trenchant criticisms
of the concept. See notes 20-24 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of their work.
17. U.S. Const. Amend. V, Amend. XIV (all citizens are entitled to "equal protection under
the law"). See also Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1995)
(indicating that the Fifth Amendmenes equal protection mandate is identical to that found in
the Fourteenth Amendment); Richard Musgrave, HorizontalEquity, Once More, 43 Natl Tax J.
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scholars both in and out of the tax context have noted, this principle
of equality has been a fixture in Western thought for thousands of
years. 18
Horizontal equity does not inform policymakers of the full
extent of an individual's rights and responsibilities with regard to the
state. Rather, once these are identified, horizontal equity simply
mandates that the state award the same benefits and impose the
same burdens on all similarly situated individuals. Because no two
people are alike in every respect, however, equal treatment could only
be mandatory for those who are alike in relevant respects. For income tax purposes, like individuals are those who are in similar economic circumstances. 19 Equal treatment of the poor, therefore, would
satisfy the mandate of horizontal equity even if that treatment
significantly disadvantaged them with respect to the wealthy (and
vice versa). Moreover, the notion of horizontal equity has nothing to
say with regard to the treatment of individuals in divergent economic
circumstances: It neither mandates nor prohibits unequal treatment
of differently situated taxpayers. This minimal rule of fairness,
therefore, does not provide the necessary criteria for judging the
legitimacy of the progressive marginal rates.
Despite these
limitations, many scholars continue to argue the concept is useful for
ensuring tax fairness.
Although horizontal equity theoretically might be a valuable
standard for determining the fairness of the tax laws, it is impossible
to implement.
Professor Barbara Fried's work highlights the
difficulty of identifying similarly situated individuals. As Fried notes,
individuals realize various levels of "economic rent" or surplus value
depending upon where they lie on any given supply or demand
curve. 20 Consider, for example, two hypothetical savers in similar
economic circumstances earning the same market rate of interest on
113 (1990) (noting that horizontal equity is grounded on constitutional principles and arguing
that the concept has unique importance for tax policy).
18. Plato and Aristotle first proclaimed the importance of equality of treatment and the
concept has dominated Western thought ever since. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 537-43 (1982) (tracing the development of the notion that likes
must be treated alike); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95
Yale L. J. 1373, 1374 (1986) ("[I]n this country, the engine of the struggle for equality has been
Aristotelian: Equality means to treat like persons alike, and unlike persons unlike."); Erwin
Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 575 (1983)
(arguing that the ideal of treating likes alike is morally, analytically, and rhetorically useful).
19. For a thorough discussion of the concept of income, see Simons, Personal Income
Taxation at 41 (cited in note 5) (providing a historical analysis of the various definitions of
income devised by a number of tax, economic, and political theorists).
20. Barbara Fried, Fairnessand the Consumption Tax, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 961, 982 (1992)
(noting that "marginal revolution" dispelled any assumption otherwise).
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their endowment. At first cut, it might appear that horizontal equity
mandates the imposition of an identical tax burden on each
individual. But imagine that the first saver is on the margin of the
supply curve-her cost for deferring consumption (or in economic
terms, her reservation price) is identical to the market rate of
interest. The second individual, however, has a reservation price
below the market rate of interest and thus is a so-called
"inframarginal" saver. 21 In short, both earn the same absolute level of
interest but the second taxpayer realizes greater surplus value (i.e.
the level of economic gains over her reservation price). Tax theorists
ignore
who ignore this differential in surplus value improperly
22
important distinctions for horizontal equity purposes.
The problem is that it is nearly impossible to identify
inframarginal savers in practice-that is, those savers for whom the
cost of deferring consumption is lower than the market rate of
interest.2 3 Nevertheless, because the inframarginal savers are in a

21. Id. at 983.
22. Id. at 982-84.
23. Id. See also Blum and Kalven, The Uneasy Case at 67 (cited in note 7) (noting that
British economist J.A. Hobson advocates progressive taxation on the grounds that it would tax
surplus value and arguing the difficulties associated with taxing only surplus value are
"legion").
The difficulty of identifying similarly situated individuals can easily be seen in the context of
the recent consumption tax proposals which are grounded upon concerns for horizontal equity
between savers and spenders. Consumption tax advocates argue that savers and consumers are
in like economic circumstances and thus are entitled to equal treatment under the Code. The
notion that consumers and savers are similarly situated might initially seem surprising in light
of the obvious fact that savers earn interest income on their endowment while consumers do
not. Consumption tax advocates, however, argue that the two groups are alike due to the costs
associated with deferring consumption Cthe abstinence theory of interest') or, alternatively,
because the marginal utility of consumption decreases over time (the "declining utility of
consumption theory"). Barbara Fried, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 968 (cited in note 20) (uncovering
hidden assumptions upon which consumption tax theorists have based their argument).
The abstinence theory of interest acknowledges that the interest earned by the saver
generates utility beyond the initial endowment but argues that the saver's additional utility is
offset by the equal psychic costs incurred by deferring consumption for the future. The
declining utility of consumption theory ignores the possible psychic costs associated with
abstaining from consumption but argues that the subjective value of consumption declines over
a taxpayer's lifetime. Thus, even though the saver might actually consume more upon earning
interest, in fact, the utility gained from the greater consumption is identical to the amount that
she could have consumed in the earlier year in light of the declining utility of consumption.
Professor Barbara Fried has persuasively argued that while the abstinence theory of
interest or the declining utility of consumption theories might prove that some savers and
consumers are similarly situated, neither proves that all savers and consumers are in similar
economic circumstances. The consumption tax argument however, only addresses a comparison
between a consumer and a saver on the margin but not a comparison between a consumer and
an inframarginal saver, thus ignoring significant disparities between the hypothetical
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better position than those on the margin, unequal treatment under
the income tax does not produce a violation of horizontal equity.
Indeed, the mandate of horizontal equity should not even come into
play.
Moreover, even if it were possible to identify all individuals
who are in like circumstances, scholars and policymakers routinely
argue that competing policy considerations must trump horizontal
equity concerns. Consider, for example, the fringe benefits an
employee obtains from her employer. Fringe benefits clearly provide
an economic benefit and thus should be viewed as taxable income
under the Federal Income Tax Code. Failure to tax the value of one
individual's fringe benefits while taxing the small monetary gains of a
second individual clearly violates horizontal equity. Yet this is
precisely what the Tax Code does in this situation and countless
others for administrative purposes. 24
taxpayers. Fried, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 982 (cited in note 20) (the marginal saver is the implicit
hero of consumption tax advocates).
The intuition underlying Fried's insight is based on widely understood economic concepts.
Individuals value both current consumption and future consumption, so that an individual will
defer consumption only if the value of the deferred consumption is at least as great as the value
of the current consumption that is given up. If the market rate of interest goes down and thus
reduces the additional consumption an individual will be able to enjoy by saving, then all else
being equal, the individual will be less willing to defer current consumption for a later year.
Consider the abstinence theory of interest, which assumes that the market rate of interest
is identical to the psychic costs of deferring consumption. Now imagine two hypothetical
individuals, Saver and Consumer, each with an initial endowment of $100 and a market interest
rate of 5%. Saver defers consumption and earns 5% interest and thus has access to $105 in year
2. Under the abstinence theory, however, Saver actually has a bundle of goods worth only $100
because of the psychic costs of deferring consumption for a year. Thus both Saver and
Consumer are in similar positions with similar levels of utility despite their different
consumption patterns and despite the interest Saver earned on her $100. Yet, because Saver
under the income tax must pay tax on $105 ($100 plus interest) she is taxed more than
Consumer despite their similar economic circumstances.
According to consumption tax
advocates, this account of each individual's utility level proves that the federal income tax
violates the mandate that all similarly situated individuals be similarly treated under the tax
laws. Id. at 968-69.
. But now consider a third hypothetical individual who has a personal discount rate of 3%
rather than the 5% market rate of interest. In other words, the psychic cost of deferring consumption to this third individual is not the market rate of interest but 2 percent below the
market rate. She will continue to save even if the market rate of interest decreases while the
saver on the margin will give up saving for current consumption. Accordingly, this inframarginal saver will earn 5% when her psychic costs associated with saving (or in economic terms,
her reservation price) is only 3%. At the end of the year she will have a bundle of goods worth
$102 because of her inframarginal position, while both the marginal Saver and Consumer will
have just $100 worth of utility. Id. at 983. In short, as Fried notes, the consumption tax
advocates have disregarded the inframarginal saver and have made the marginal saver the
"implicit hero" of their analysis.
-24. I.R.C. § 132 (1996) (excluding fringe benefits from the definition of taxable income).
See also Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 Geo. L. J. 1571, 1577-78 (1996) (noting that
women's household labor is widely perceived to provide substantial economic income to their
families but that the value of this income is left untaxed for administrative purposes). Perhaps
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In addition to administrative concerns, efficiency concerns
routinely prevail over horizontal equity. Indeed, economists have long
argued that the canon of equal treatment of equals in taxation
produces irrational tax policy. The economist Edmund Phelps for
example, has argued that "[n]o efficient tax system... would overlook
opportunities to discriminate among sources of income owing to their
differing capacities to avoid the incidence of taxation."2 Efficient
taxation, according to Phelps and others, would entail taxing certain
individuals more than others based on the inelasticity of their
26
behavior or the their degree of commitment to an activity.

even more problematic than the failure to tax fringe benefits is the fact that this slight deviation
from equal treatment would count as a violation of horizontal equity while legislators could
ignore further differential treatment (because the two individuals are now in dissimilar
circumstances due the prior differential tax treatment) no matter how significant. Louis
Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures In Search of a Principle, 42 Nat!l Tax J. 139, 140-41
(1989) (noting that infinitesimal differences in treatment raise horizontal equity problems while
further violations can be ignored under the standard).
25. Edmund S. Phelps, Rational Taxation, 44 Social Research 657, 658 (1977). See also
F.P. Ramsey, A Contributionto a Theory of Taxation, 37 Econ. J. 47, 47-61 (1927) (arguing that
the most efficient tax is one that taxes in inverse proportion to the elasticity of demand).
26. The argument for discriminatory tax treatment is related to economic theorists'
concern for the operation of the free-market economy and the difficulty of reconciling taxation
with the free-market ideal. That taxation can be at all consistent with free-market principles is
surprising. The principle of taxation is, after all, a "purely communist one, since the right to
levy taxes is derived in all countries from so-called national property. For either private
property is sacrosanct, in which case there is no such thing as national property and the state
has no right to levy taxes, or the state has the right, in which case private property is not
sacrosanct." Freidrich Engels, Speeches in Elberfeld, February 8, 1945 in 4 Karl Marx and
FriedrichEngels, Collected Work 254 (International Publishers, 1975). But see Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in 10 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
Selected Works 330-31 (1978) (arguing tax reform will not threaten the foundations of capitalism
or redistribute wealth and thus is the "hobby horse of every radical bourgeois").
Nonetheless the argument with regard to market inefficiencies and taxation relates to the
shift in taxpayers' behavior caused by the tax. Consider a tax on wages that reduces a
taxpayer's spending power and thus her ability to consume. If the taxpayer seeks to maintain
her pre-tax level of consumption, she must work additional hours after the imposition of the tax.
In economic terms, the taxpayer incurs an income effect. Joseph Stiglitz, Economics of the
Public Sector 460 (Norton, 1988). The tax on wages, however, does not always produce an
income effect. Because the tax reduces the economic benefits associated with waged labor, the
individual might decide she values leisure more than consumption in light of the increased
number of hours she must work to maintain her pre-tax level of consumption. Thus, rather
than working additional hours in the waged labor market, the individual might decide to substitute leisure for work, thereby producing a substitution effect. At high income levels, the
individual is likely to incur a substitution effect while at low income levels the individual is
likely to incur an income effect. See id. at 437-504.
The same choices exist when the government imposes a tax on commodities. For example,
suppose a tax were placed on butter but not margarine. Consumers might then substitute
margarine for butter even though in the absence of the tax, they would prefer butter. Thus the
tax will cause a taxpayer to change her behavior, thereby producing market inefficiencies-an
individual will choose margarine when she in fact prefers butter. According to economic
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The practical application of an efficient tax can be seen in the
context of "sin taxes" on alcohol and tobacco products. Studies indicate that goods such as cigarettes and alcohol are price inelastic.
Thus, the demand curve for these goods is steep, ensuring that individuals will not turn to other commodities simply because the tax
raises its price. According to efficiency-oriented theorists, therefore,
the government should tax cigarettes and alcohol at high levels because the tax will not discourage their consumption. 27 In short, even
if two individuals are in identical economic circumstances, with the
only difference being that one is addicted to nicotine while the other is
a non-smoker, many efficiency theorists would argue that
discriminating between the two individuals is good tax policy in light
of the market distortions that equal treatment would produce. 28

theorists, taxation will make an individual worse off no matter how she adjusts to the law, but
certain taxes produce greater inefficiencies than others.
The extent of the inefficiency produced by the tax can be measured by the excess burden of
the tax. The excess burden is tied to the substitution effect; the greater the substitution effect
the greater the excess burden of the tax. The most efficient tax, by this standard, is a head tax.
A head tax requires each individual to pay a predetermined amount regardless of her income,
consumption patterns, or any other personal circumstances. Because the taxpayer could not
avoid the head tax by changing her behavior, the tax cannot produce substitution effects.
Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of the
Constitution34-35 (Cambridge U., 1980); Gareth D. Myles, Public Economics 45-46 (Cambridge
U., 1995) (noting that a lump sum tax does not avoid the cost associated with implementation
and collection). Of course, an individual could avoid the tax by ceasing to exist for tax purposes,
for example, by expatriation.
27. Of course, the legislators also might impose a high tax on items such as cigarettes and
alcohol in an effort to drive smokers and drinkers out of the market. For an interesting article
exploring the economic rationale for doing this and the potential unfairness associated with
such a policy, see W. Kip Vicusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking, in
James M. Poterba, ed., Tax Policy and the Economy 51-101 (MIT Press, 1995). See also Jendi B.
Reiter, Citizens or Sinners?-The Economic and PoliticalInequity of "Sin Taxes" on Tobacco and
Alcohol Products,29 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 443, 449 (1996) (arguing that sin taxes are both
regressive and inefficient).
28. This optimal theory of taxation, see note 26, is also relevant in the labor context.
Consider, for example, an individual who will work for only $6 per hour. Any salary below that
amount will cause her to leave the waged labor market for nonmarket or leisure activities. The
taxpayer has a perfectly elastic supply curve for labor. If Congress imposes a 10% income tax,
the individual will earn just $5.40 per hour. Because the taxpayer has decided to work only for
$6 or more an hour, she will quit the waged labor market. Consequently, the taxpayer will have
no income, the employer will have no access to labor, and the government will gain no revenue.
Taxing elastic behavior, therefore, produces only losses and thus makes no economic sense.
Accordingly, optimal tax theorists argue that Congress should impose a tax only upon individuals with inelastic labor supply curves. In short, Congress should tax those individuals who
prefer market labor over all other activities regardless of the ultimate after-tax salary. A 10%
(or even higher) tax rate will not cause individuals with inelastic labor supply curves to give up
their market labor and thus the tax will not have a substitution effect and, in turn, will produce
fewer inefficiencies in the market. For a specific policy proposal based on these effects, see
Edward McCaffery, Taxing Women (forthcoming 1997) (pointing to empirical studies indicating
that women's waged labor curves are more elastic than men's and taking the position that
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Congress to impose equal tax burdens on equally situated individuals,
therefore raises a number of barriers for policymakers. First, as
Professor Fried's work shows, it is next to impossible to identify similarly situated individuals and any attempt to do so will most likely
produce the very same inequities that theorists and legislators seek to
remedy. Second, policymakers' concern for administrative complexity
has produced a number of provisions that exempt certain. items from
taxation. Although the exemptions and limitations should register a
violation of the narrow version of horizontal equity, most theorists
would argue any attempt to tax small gains could only lead to further
complexity and tax avoidance problems. Finally, economists have
argued that even if it were possible to identify similarly situated
individuals, it is irrational to pursue a policy of horizontal fairness.
Efficiency-oriented tax theorists argue the Federal Tax Code should
discriminate between individuals based on the elasticity of their
preferences in order to reduce the market inefficiencies associated
with taxation.
These theoretical and practical problems have reduced the
importance of the traditional command that equals be treated equally
under the Code. Consequently, many tax theorists have turned to a
more expansive version of horizontal equity as a measure of fairness.
The expansive or modified version of horizontal equity requires the
preservation of the taxpayer's relative position in the pre-tax distribution of income. 29 In other words, horizontal equity might also encompass the appeal to maintain the relative rank ordering of taxpayer
wealth prior to the imposition of the tax. 30 This version of horizontal
Congress should tax men at higher rates than women to avoid the problematic substitution
effects).
29. See, for example, M.A. King, An Index of Inequality: With Applications to Horizontal
Equity and Social Mobility, 51 Econometrica 99, 99-115 (1983) (advocating broad version of
horizontal equity). See also Marcus C. Berlian and Robert P. Strauss, The Horizontal and
Vertical Equity Characteristicsof the Federal Income Tax, 1966-1977, in Martin David and
Timothy Smeeding, eds., HorizontalEquity, Uncertainty,and Economic Well-Being 179-80 (U. of
Chicago, 1985) (noting that the narrow version of horizontal equity is logically separate from the
more expansive notion of horizontal equity). See also note 30. The expansive version of fairness
dates back to the nineteenth century. See, for example, J.R. McCulloch, A Treatise on the
Principlesand PracticalInfluence of Taxation and the FundingSystem 17 (William Clones and
Sons, 1863) ("[N]o tax on income can be a just tax unless it leaves individuals in the same
relative condition in which it found them.").
30. The mandate that tax policy must maintain the rank ordering is significantly different
from the mandate of treating likes alike. For example, consider four hypothetical taxpayers A,
B, C, and D. In the pre-tax distribution of income, A and B both have $10, and C and D each
have $100. According to the narrow definition of horizontal equity, merely requiring likes be
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fairness, therefore, calls for policymakers not only to treat likes alike,
but it also calls for policymakers to preserve the existing inequalities
of wealth.
Unlike the narrow version of horizontal fairness, the expansive
version seriously circumscribes the extent to which policymakers are
permitted to treat taxpayers differently under the vertical fairness
norm. By protecting an individual's relative rank in the distribution
of wealth, the expansive version of horizontal fairness does not permit
policymakers to equalize wealth or to give tax subsidies that push the
income of one individual up to or beyond that of another with greater
pre-tax income. Accordingly, if tax theorists and policymakers embrace the expansive version of horizontal fairness, they in effect take
a position in the progressivity debate. They argue that while some
level of progressivity might be justified, the progressive marginal
rates cannot be so steep that they reverse the rank ordering of taxpayers in the distribution of wealth.3 ' Thus, if the narrow version of
horizontal equity is of little use in taxation as I have argued, then the
only relevant question for tax theorists relates to vertical equity-or
on what basis and to what extent is differential treatment between
individuals justified?32 Accordingly, this Article focuses on the theoretical arguments made in the progressivity debate with regard to the
concept of vertical equity.

treated alike, A and B must both suffer the same tax burden, as should C and D. Thus, if A and
B both owe $1 while C and D each owe $99, producing a post-tax distribution of income where A
and B have $9 while C and D each have $1, there is no violation of the narrow version of
fairness. If the more substantive version is used, however, the tax burdens would register a
violation of horizontal fairness because the relative rank-ordering of the individuals has
changed with the imposition of the tax. See Berlian and Strauss, Horizontal and Vertical
Equity, in David and Smeeding, eds., Horizontal Equity, Uncertainty, and Economic Well-Being
at 179-80 (cited in note 29), for a variety of other hypotheticals proving this point.
31. Tax theorists routinely characterize the mandate that an individual's relative position
in the pre-tax distribution of income be maintained as an aspect of horizontal equity and not
vertical equity. See Fried, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 999-1016 (cited in note 20) (indicating that the
ethical mandate to preserve an individual's position in the pre-tax distribution of income is a
horizontal equity concept); Kaplow, 42 Natl Tax J. at 146-50 (cited in note 24) (same). But see
Berlian and Strauss, Horizontal and Vertical Equity, in David and Smeeding, eds., Horizontal
Equity, Uncertainty,and Economic Well-Being 180-82 (cited in note 29) (arguing the expansive
version of horizontal equity is more accurately characterized as a vertical equity concept).
32. In short, horizontal equity, in the trenchant words of a Peter Westen, is an idea that
should be "banished from moral and legal discourse as an explanatory norm." Westen, 95 Harv.
L. Rev. at 542 (cited in note 18). It adds nothing to the debate and perhaps even obscures the
important issues at hand. But see Kenneth L. Karst, Why EqualityMatters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245,
246 (1983) (arguing that the notion of equality is not a simple abstraction but a substantive
ideal).
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B. Vertical Equity and the ProgressivityDebate
While horizontal equity calls for the equal treatment of equals,
vertical equity entails appropriately differentiating among individuals
in dissimilar economic circumstances. The legitimacy of the vertical
equity norm has been the source of political, moral, and legal debate
throughout the history of federal income taxation. Prior to the time
Congress adopted the first federal income tax in 1894 most argued the
state must avoid distinguishing between citizens regardless of their
differing economic circumstances. Countless theorists argued that
the opportunity to distinguish between individual citizens could only
lead legislators to adopt tax laws that reflected their own or their
constituents' class biases. 33 This fear of undeserved preferential
treatment prompted many early theorists to argue against any notion
of vertical equity.
By the turn of the twentieth century, however, support for the
idea that fairness requires differentiation between individuals began
to swell. Indeed, many claimed that Congress not only must consider
questions of vertical equity, but also must implement progressive
marginal tax rates that require the wealthy to contribute a greater
percentage of their income to the public good than the poor.
Understanding this turn in tax theory and the controversy it has
sparked requires a brief historical exploration of the development of
the income tax laws.
Prior to 1894, Congress had used a system of tariffs and commodity taxes which resulted in a steeply regressive tax system. By
imposing a tax on imported and domestic commodities, Congress
ensured that all consumers contributed precisely the same amount to
the federal government upon each purchase. In short, not only were
individuals in like circumstances treated alike, but individuals in
differing economic circumstances were also treated alike. Because the
poor consumed a greater percentage of their wealth than did the rich,

33. Randolph Paul, Taxation in the United States 2-36 (Longmans, Green and Co., 1954)
(discussing early taxation theory). See also Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Propertyand the Limits
of American Constitutionalism: The MadisonianFramework and Its Legacy 1-67 (U. of Chicago,
1990) (providing a fascinating historical account of the Framers' worries about class bias and
the possible approaches for remedying this potential problem in legislation).
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to contribute a
however, this uniform tax treatment caused the poor
34

greater percentage of their wealth to the public good.
Populist social reformers argued that the regressive tax system
played a key role in the unequal distribution of income that ultimately relegated the poor to an uneasy economic existence while the
wealthy indulged in a more luxurious lifestyle. The social reformers
argued that Congress must redeem "the overburdened and discouraged working people" by making legal distinctions between individuals and by replacing the regressive tax structure with a progressive
one.3 5 The Populists, in effect, suggested that Congress should
transform its notion of equity from one of "equal treatment of all" to
one that encompassed concerns for individuals in divergent economic
circumstances.
Economic historians interested in the development of the federal income tax structure argue that it was the Populist argument
that prompted the federal legislature to consider the concept of
vertical equity. In its effort to achieve greater social justice in the
law,3 6 Congress adopted a two percent tax on annual income exceeding
$4,000 in 1894.37 Since the average income was well below $1,000, the
vast majority of the population would not pay the federal income tax.3 8
Although reformers applauded the tax, others viewed it as an
34. See Robert Stanley, Dimensions of Law in the Service of Order: Origins of the Federal
Income Tax, 1861-1913 at 13 (Oxford U., 1993) (noting the regressive nature of the tariff
troubled even its authors).
35. Of course, vertical equity does not necessarily lead to a particular tax structure.
Indeed, distinguishing between individuals could produce a tax system that is progressive,
proportional, or regressive. The tax structure that policymakers choose pursuant to the
constraints of vertical equity depends on the underlying theory of justice and key economic
assumptions. Certain widespread assumptions and theories of justice, however, have led
federal legislators to adopt and maintain a progressive marginal tax system since 1894.
36. See, for example, Roy Blakey and Gladys Blakey, The FederalIncome Tax (Longmans,
Green and Co., 1940) C'T]he [federal] income tax.. . had only a loose causal connection with the
Civil War income taxes; it was really the result of a great equalitarian movement generated by
two prolonged post-war depressions of great severity."); Randolph Paul, Taxation in the United
States 30-70 (Little, Brown, 1954) (federal income legislation was the symbol of populist reform);
Sidney Ratner, Taxation and Democracy in America 145-192 (Wiley, 1967) (arguing that the
Populist revolt encouraged legislators to incorporate the interests of the poor in tax legislation);
John K_ Buenker, The Income Tax in the ProgressiveEra 40 (Garland Publishers, 1985) (stating
that the income tax was tied to the Populist notion that the burden should be shifted from
consumers, laborers, and farmers to financiers and capitalists who had benefited under the
tariff and through industrial expansion); John F. Witte, The Limits of Symbolic Reform 70-75
(Wisconsin U. Press, 1985) (noting that the Populist agenda was supported by the legislators
who proposed the income tax); Ronald F. King, Money, Time, & Politics 94 (Yale U., 1995)
(noting that the Democrat's left-wing proponents of the income tax saw themselves as defending
fundamental democratic values against the selfish demands of the wealthy).
37. James W. Ely, Jr., The Chief Justiceship of Melville W. Fuller, 1888-1910, 117-25 (U.
South Carolina, 1995) (discussing the details of the tax and the Supreme Courts response).
38. Buenker, Income Tax in the ProgressiveEra at 348 (cited in note 36).
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illegitimate exercise of the federal government's power.
The
progressive rate system, it was argued, clearly violated the most basic
tenet of fairness-that the government treat all citizens alike
regardless of personal circumstances. Not only would the income tax
produce varying effects on citizens based on their level of income, it
would also produce a geographic bias because the northeast section of
the country had far greater income than the other areas of the
country. Many commentators saw the income tax as so out of line
with American values at the time it was adopted that its advocates
were labeled "communists" and "socialists" who were seeking an
"undemocratic" measure that would penalize hard work and ruin the
39
domestic economy.

39. Id. at 11. Immediately upon Congress's adoption of the tax, Charles Pollock filed suit
in the Southern District of New York arguing that the tax directly violated the Constitution.
The district court verdict was appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and then argued
twice in the Supreme Court. Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 430 (1895);
Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 602 (1895) (rehearing). Finding that the
Constitution gave Congress the power to tax, but not the power to impose an income tax with a
geographical bias, the Court declared the tax unconstitutional. Id. at 634-37.
Despite the Court's holding in Pollock, popular interest in the income tax remained strong.
Many theorists argued that the Court simply misinterpreted the Constitution and took the
position that Congress should reenact the legislation despite the unfavorable Pollock decision.
Ultimately, Congress proposed the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution which, when
ratified, provided, "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard
to any census or enumeration." In effect, the Sixteenth Amendment gave the federal government the power to adopt the income tax. Buenker, Income Tax in the Progressive Era at 386
(cited in note 36) (discussing the amendment process and the amendment itself).
Like the progressivity debate, the Pollock decision itself has been the subject of much
debate. The Pollock decision sparked a strong public reaction that reflected the divisiveness of
the issue at the time it was decided. Newspapers around the country reported that the Pollock
decision was the final blow to communism while others complained the Supreme Court had
frustrated the popular will of the people. Ely, Chief Justiceship of Melville W. Fuller at 117-25
(cited in note 37). The debate over Pollock continues even now among historians. Many
historians argue the Court sought to protect the interests of wealthy citizens subject to the tax
when invalidating the law. See, for example, Stanley, Dimensions of Law in the Service of Order
at 136-175 (cited in note 34). Others argue that the Court did not seek to safeguard wealthy
individuals as a class, but rather hoped to restrain the hand of the federal government in light
of its potential to adopt measures that would work to the advantage or disadvantage of any
identifiable group. See, for example, Ely, Chief Justiceshipof Melville W. Fuller at 117-25 (cited
in note 37). Ely's argument, of course, does not preclude the argument that the Court
nevertheless hoped to protect the wealthy. In limiting the federal government's taxing power
the Court indicated it would "prevent an attack upon accumulated property" by the majority,
who were not property owners. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 583. In short, the Court seemed worried
that, left to its own devices, the democratic political process would produce laws that
systematically advanced the interests of the poor majority while imposing costs on the wealthy
minority. See Nedelsky, PrivateProperty at 16-66 (cited in note 33) (noting that the Framers of
the U.S. Constitution had precisely this worry).
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The progressive marginal rate structure clearly reflected a
concern for the economic interests of the poor. By taxing the wealthy
and excluding the poor from the scope of the laws, the legislature
unambiguously advantaged the poor. At the same time, however, the
rates set the stage for a century of debate over the rights and responsibilities of the wealthy and the simultaneous exclusion of the poor
from taxation discourse.
In the next four subparts, I explore the various theories put
The
forth either in support or as criticism of progressivity.
affirmative case for the progressive tax rates has rested largely on
early social contract theory and a welfarist conception of distributive
justice. 4° The case against progressivity has rested primarily on the
entitlement theory of justice and efficiency concerns. While tax
theorists are deeply divided on the legitimacy of progressivity, they
are not divided on the question of how to treat the poor. Throughout
this Part, I show that this consensus has led theorists to ignore
completely the possibility that the poor have either a right to income
beyond a minimal exemption from taxation, or a responsibility to the
state despite their disadvantaged economic circumstances.
1. Early Social Contract Theory
Early theorists argued that individual tax burdens should be
commensurate with the economic benefits an individual obtained from
the state. The idea underlying this benefit theory of taxation grew
out of Thomas Hobbes's general political theory, which conceived of41
the state as an agency with both protective and coercive powers.
Using the principles underlying Hobbes's political theory, early tax
theorists argued that the state legitimately could coerce its citizens to
pay for the valuable goods and services it provided just as if an

40. For a discussion of these theories and various other theories supporting progressive
taxation, see Elmer D. Fagan, Recent and Contemporary Theories of Progressive Taxation, in
Richard Musgrave and Carl Shoup, eds., Reading in the Economics of Taxation 19-53 (Irwin,
1959) (discussing the sacrifice theories, the faculty theory, the surplus income theory, the social
importance theory, and the socio-political theory).
41. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 238 (Cambridge U., 1991) (asserting that both the wealthy
and the poor benefit from the government's protective measures and thus should pay for such
benefits). See also Stephen Weston, Principles of Justice in Taxation 76-98 (AMS Press, 1968)
(discussing the derivation of the benefit theory and the work of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke,
and Jean Jacques Rousseau). For a discussion of modern contractarian theory, see Jody S.
Kraus, The Limits of Hobbessian Contractarianism27-36 (Cambridge U., 1993); for a discussion
of the idea in contemporary politics, see generally D. Lee Bawden, ed., The Social Contract

Revisited: Aims and Outcomes of President Reagan's Social Welfare Policy (Urban Institute
Press, 1984).

1997]

PROGRESSVTY DEBATE

937

individual had contracted for them in the private market.42 The case
for progressivity under the benefit theory rested on the idea that the
wealthy derived a greater level of governmental benefits than the
poor and thus were contractually obligated to pay a greater portion of
the costs of public goods.43
While the benefit theory was attractive in theory and garnered
much support, considerable disagreement existed with regard to the
measure of the benefits received by individuals at different income
levels. Although most agreed that the social contract called for the
government to protect private property, which in turn encouraged
market activities and ultimately created greater opportunities for all
citizens, many argued that as an empirical matter it was next to impossible to identify the actual benefits one obtained from the state.
Accordingly, the notion that the wealthy received more and thus
should pay more was deeply disputed. Indeed, some argued that the
benefits derived from government activities could inure to the poor to
a greater extent than to the rich.44 Moreover, the very notion of identifying the value of social goods made little sense to some theorists.
In critiquing the benefit theorists, John Stuart Mill argued that "the
practice of setting definite values on things essentially indefinite, and
making them a ground of practical conclusions, is particularly fertile
4
in false views of social questions. 5

42. See, for example, Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations 651 (London, Routledge & Sons,
1900) ("The expense of government to the individuals ... is like the expense of management to
the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their
interests of the estate."); Nassau Senior, Political Economy 74-75 (London, Griffith, 1874)
(stating that the collection of revenue should be determined by the same principles that
determine all economic exchanges); Arthur Latham Perry, An Introduction to PoliticalEconomy
516 (Scribner & Sons, 1874) (asserting that taxation finds a "ready and solid justification in the
common principles of exchange"); Erasmus Peshine Smith, PoliticalEconomy 264 (G.P. Putnam,
1853) ('As government renders services to each and every one of its constituents, everyone
ought to contribute to the expense of its maintenance in the ratio that he receive advantage.").
43. Seligman, Progressive Taxation at 181-228 (cited in note 2) (exploring the work of
twenty-seven English, French, and German political theorists who advocated progressive
taxation under the benefit theory). Of course, the wealthy would have to derive a much greater
absolute level of benefits to justify a proportional tax, let alone a progressive tax.
44. See John Stuart Mill, Principles of PoliticalEconomy 805 (Longmans, Green, 1920)
(arguing that citizens with great wealth or high levels of consumption did not necessarily
benefit from governmental goods and services and, in fact, might rely on the government less
than "those who were weakest in mind or body"); Weston, Principlesof Justice at 127-38 (cited
in note 41) (noting that the German economist Karl von Hock and the French economist Simone
de Sismondi both argued that the benefits of the government did not accrue simply because of
property ownership but also involved immaterial qualities such as "honor, glory, education, and
national well-being").
45. Mill, Principlesof PoliticalEconomy at 805 (cited in note 44).
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A notable aspect of the tax theorists' use of Hobbes's political
theory in the sphere of taxation was the lack of significant disagreement over the treatment of the poor. Most benefit theorists argued
that individuals living at or below the subsistence levels of income
should be completely exempt from taxation. 46 While widespread
agreement on this matter existed, the underlying rationale for exempting the poor under a theory that viewed taxation as part of a
contractual relationship between individual citizens and the state was
unclear. Although the exemption from taxation implicitly reflected
the view that poor individuals were entitled to keep their minimal
economic resources, the early social contract theorists did not thoroughly investigate this idea. Some theorists argued that the poor had
no duty to contribute because they did not participate in the protection and enjoyment of the state. 47 The accuracy of this claim, however, was widely disputed while the exemption of the poor from taxation was not.48 Other theorists argued that the underlying rationale
for releasing the poor from the social contract was simply the practical impossibility of collecting anything of value from the poor. In
commenting on the impossibility of actually collecting a tax from an
individual simply because he was a citizen of the state, Jeremy
Bentham noted, "because a man has a head, it does not follow he has
49
anything else."

Theorists failed to explore the possibility that the benefit theory mandated that all individuals, wealthy and poor, contribute to the
public good, be it through property or some other form of

46. See, for example, Jeremy Bentham, Principlesof the Civil Code, in H Collected Works
319 (Russell and Russell, 1962) (arguing that the poor should be exempt from taxation); James
Steuart, An Inquiry into the PoliticalEconomy 298, 314, 317 (U. of Chicago, 1966) (stating that
whatever individuals consume beyond the necessary should be taxed). See also Seligman,
Progressive Taxation at 150-53 (cited in note 2) (noting that even those committed to
proportional taxation under the benefit theory in fact advocated a degressive tax that accounted
for an exemption for minimum subsistence levels of income). But see Smith, 2 Wealth of
Nations at 476-77 (cited in note 42) (arguing that taxation will not harm the poor because wages
will naturally increase to enable subsistence living).
47. Seligman, Progressive Taxation at 187-92 (cited in note 2) (identifying German and
French tax theorists who took the position that the wealthy gain more from the state than the
poor).
48. The benefit theory was first criticized for its inability to provide guidance for
determining how much an individual could or should pay in light of her individual
circumstances. To this criticism, benefit theorists argued that "bakers and grocers do not sell
commodities for prices that vary with the purchasers' income and thus tax policy should not be
forced to accomodate individuals' varying levels of income." Seligman, Progressive Taxation at
105 (cited in note 2) (discussing the critique of the benefit theory).
49. Bentham, Principlesof the Civil Code, in II Collected Works at 319 (cited in note 46).
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contribution.50
Of course, this failure to consider the potential
obligation of the poor to contribute to the public good may have
worked to advance the interests of the poor. By releasing them from
any obligation to contribute to the greater social good, the benefit
theorists avoided pushing poor individuals deeper into poverty. Even
more importantly, social contract theorists avoided the conclusion
that without access to valuable property, the poor must contribute
labor-the only resource that many possessed.
At the same time, however, the tax theorists' failure to consider the possibility that all individuals should contribute may have
been more detrimental than beneficial to low-income individuals. The
assumption that the poor had nothing of value to contribute to society
leads to the idea that the poor are not valuable citizens, but are a
burden upon the state and society-at-large. It ignores the possibility
that all individuals must benefit and contribute in order to fully participate in the political and social institutions found in a democratic
state. 51 Thus while the benefit theorists raised serious and difficult
questions with regard to the obligations of individual citizens under
the social contract, they analyzed this issue only with regard to the
relatively wealthy. The failure to bring to the surface and to discuss
explicitly discuss the responsibilities of citizens at all income levels
foreshadowed a tradition in tax theory that has been followed by a
surprising range of political, economic, and moral theorists in the
taxation context.
The potential for the Tax Code to facilitate contributions by the
poor to the greater social good, despite their lack of economic resources, is explored in Part IV below.
2. Utilitarianism
By the early twentieth century, tax theorists had rejected the
early social contract theory of taxation and looked to a welfarist (or
end-state) theory of justice as a means for justifying the allocation of

50. The inability to contribute income does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that one
must contribute services. See Part IV for a discussion of how the poor might satisfy a duty to
contribute without adopting laws that, in effect, coerce their labor.
51. Actively participating in social and political institutions is viewed by many theorists to
be a key aspect of one's full citizenship status. See, for example, Will Kymlicka and Wayne
Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 Ethics 352,
352-53 (1994) (providing an excellent survey of recent theoretical work focusing on the rights
and obligations of citizens).
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the tax burden.52 Welfarist theories, in general, judge the goodness of
a society by the welfare or utility of the individual citizens. 53
Utilitarianism, in particular, judges the welfare of society according to
the unweighted sum of the utilities of its members.
Although
proponents of utilitarianism desire to maximize welfare, they do not
focus on or advocate any particular distribution of income." Instead,
a utilitarian would argue that any distribution of wealth is good to the
extent that it maximizes overall welfare. Utilitarians, therefore,
analyze vertical fairness with the aim of maximizing society's overall
utility rather than the level of benefits any particular individual
derives from the public goods themselves.
Thus utilitarianism
imposes a moral obligation upon citizens to pay taxes pursuant to a
tax structure that minimizes overall costs-or maximizes aggregate
utility. This obligation exists even if a policy calls for certain
individuals to pay more than others for the common good. In short, a
utilitarian is not interested in the advantages and disadvantages to
specific individuals but instead is focused on aggregate welfare.
John Stuart Mill was one of the earliest writers to expressly
consider utilitarianism in the context of taxation. 55 Mill argued that
by requiring each citizen to incur an equal sacrifice, policymakers
would minimize overall sacrifice. 56 Equality of sacrifice, however, did

52. Theorists have not completely rejected the early social contract theory, but have
sought to modify it in order to account for the fact that no individual would enter a contract that
bound them to poverty. See, for example, Rawls, A Theory of Justiceat 266 (cited in note 10).
53. The entitlement theory is more extensively discussed in Part II.B.4.
54. See generally Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianismand Beyond
(Cambridge U., 1982) (collection of fourteen essays for and against the utilitarian ethic). See
also Bankman and Griffith, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1949 (cited in note 2) (briefly describing
utilitarianism and various other theories of distributive justice and their relationship to
taxation).
55. Weston, Principlesof Justice in Taxation at 187-88 (cited in note 41).
56. Mill, Principlesof PoliticalEconomy at 804 (cited in note 44). Although Mill's position
seems to call for identical tax burdens, many theorists have noted that Mill, in fact, argued that
individuals pay an equal proportion of their income and not an equal amount. See, for example,
Fagan, Recent and Contemporary Theories of Progressive Taxation at 20 n.2, in Musgrave and
Shoup, eds., Readings in the Economics of Taxation (cited in note 40). See also Barbara Fried,
Robert Hale and Progressive Legal Economics ch.4 (forthcoming Harvard U.) (discusisng in
detail Mill's position on "equal sacrifice").
While many contemporary tax theorists applaud the concept of equal sacrifice, its meaning
is far from clear. Indeed there were and continue to be at least two variants of the equal
sacrifice theory-each supported by a different philosophical argument. Entitlement theorists
intent on protecting the income earned in a fair exchange argue for a tax structure that requires
an equal absolute sacrifice. Pursuant to this approach, the tax system would require each
individual to pay an identical amount in taxes regardless of individual economic circumstances.
The head tax would produce an equal absolute sacrifice by all citizens and is advocated by some
entitlement theorists. Schoenblum, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol. at 258-71 (cited in note 10). Another
variation of the sacrifice theory often advocated by theorists uncomfortable with the head tax
but committed to the notion of "equal treatmene' is a tax system that requires an equal propor-
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not necessarily lead to the conclusion that each individual should pay
an equal amount to the greater social good. Indeed, prominent tax
and economic theorists at the turn of the twentieth century persuasively argued that to ensure equality of sacrifice, Congress must adopt
progressive marginal tax rates.
The claim for progressivity was grounded in the notion that
money had decreasing marginal utility. Political and economic theorists argued that beyond the satisfaction of basic needs, the utility of
additional wants and preferences diminishes. 57 Accordingly a dollar
has less value to a millionaire than to a pauper. Based on the decreasing marginal utility of income theory, theorists argued that to
take the same number of dollars from both the wealthy and the poor
was not to require an equal sacrifice. Although taxing both under the
same marginal rate would not affect the absolute level of revenue
obtained by the government, it would affect overall utility. The utilitarian calculus, therefore, called for a progressive marginal rate system that imposed a greater tax on the wealthy than on the poor, but
imposed the same costs in terms of utility.58

As many utilitarians noted, the idea that income has declining
marginal utility along with the ethical mandate to maximize overall

tional sacrifice from each citizen. A flat tax would require each citizen to contribute the same
percentage of income to the government and thus would entail an equal proportional sacrifice to
the public good. The flat tax recently advocated by Representative Dick Armey and 1996
presidential candidate M. Steven Forbes would have had this effect. Importantly, each
approach allows for an exemption from taxation for the truly poor. For a discussion of these
issues, see Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 739, 766 (1995)
(exploring the various meanings of equity in the tax context).
57. See, for example, Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, 2 Papers Relating to Political Economy
240 (MacMillan, 1925); Blum and Kalven, The Uneasy Case at 41 n.103 (cited in note 7)
(agreeing with the notion that "income below the subsistence level has infinite utility"); M.
Hare, Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds.,
Utilitarianismand Beyond 27 (Cambridge U., 1982) (noting the decreasing marginal utility of
all commodities and of money justifies a fairly high degree of equality of individual's access to
goods).
58. Specifically, Mill argued:
As government ought to make no distinction of persons of classes in the strength of their
claims on it, whatever sacrifices it requires from them should be made to bear as nearly
as possible with the same pressure upon all, which, it must be observed, is the mode by
which least sacrifice is occasionedon the whole. If any one bears less than his fair share
of burden, some other person must suffer more than his share, and the alleviation to the
one is not, ceteris paribus, so great a good to him, as the increased pressure upon the
other as an evil. Equality of taxation, therefore, as a maxim of politics means equality of
sacrifice. It means apportioning the contribution of each person toward the expense of
government so that he shall feel neither more nor less inconvenience from his share of
the payment than every other person experiences from his.
Mill, Principlesat 804 (cited in note 44).
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utility could lead to a tax structure that taxes the rich for the benefit
of the poor up to the point at which equality of income is achieved.
Because poor individuals gain greater utility from each dollar than
wealthy individuals, cash transfers from the rich to the poor are justified under the utilitarian ethic until equality of income is attained.
Thus income above the mean would be taxed at a 100% rate, and all
individuals with incomes below the mean would receive cash transfers
to bring their income up to that level.59 Although theorists acknowledged that a pure utilitarian ethic would lead to equality of income,
few, if any, endorsed this outcome. Instead, utilitarian theorists argued that policymakers should impose a tax burden on the wealthy
far below 100% and at the same time should not redistribute wealth
to the poor on such a grand scale, but simply should exclude them
from taxation. A marginal tax rate of 100%, it was argued, would
curb wealthy individuals' incentive to work and at the same time
redistribution would operate as a disincentive for the poor to enter the
waged labor market.60 Accordingly, the utilitarians, like the early
social contract theorists, argued for less steep progressive rates along
with an exemption for the poor from taxation.
While many theorists questioned the rationality of a tax structure that confiscated all income above the mean due to the market
disincentives, some also questioned the accuracy of the decreasing
marginal utility curve of money for individuals at all income levels.
Accurately comparing the utility level of each additional dollar gained
by persons at different income levels, it was argued, was impossible. 61
59. See Bankman and Griffith, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1947 (cited in note 2). See also F.Y.
Edgeworth, The PureTheory of ProgressiveTaxation in Economic Justice 371, 373-74 (Penguin,
1973).
60. Thomas Carver, The Minimum Sacrifice Theory of Taxation, 19 Pol. Sci. Q. 66 (1904);
Thomas Carver, The Ethical Basis of Distribution, 6 Annals of the Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci.,
73, 73-79 (1895). See also Seligman, Progressive Taxation at 847-69 (cited in note 2) (citing a
number of political economists who worried about the negative effects of a steeply progressive
tax yet still advocated progressivity).
61. Seligman, Progressive Taxation at 847-69 (cited in note 2). Walter Blum and Harry
Kalven have perhaps noted the problem in the most clear terms. Blum and Kalven argue:
Men have long speculated over whether the man in the palace is happier than the man
in the cottage. On the one hand there is no doubt that money is good and that it is
desirable. On the other hand, it seems that whenever we try to state more precisely its
relationship to happiness the result approaches an absurdity. The error lies in trying to
translate money, which can be measure in definite units, into corresponding units of
satisfaction or well-being. In the end satisfaction in the sense of happiness defies
quantification. Utility is a meaningful concept; units of utility are not. It is in the face
of this difficulty, even waiving all other objections, the whole elaborate analysis of
progression in terms of sacrifice and utility finally collapses ....
Blum and Kalven, The Uneasy Case at 63 (cited in note 7).
Indeed, even theorists sympathetic to progressivity have acknowledged that while individuals living in poverty derive infinite value from each dollar, a stronger claim with regard to
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At the same time, however, even theorists critical of the
decreasing marginal utility curve theory were willing to acknowledge
that income has infinite utility to individuals living below the
subsistence level.62

Accordingly, utilitarian theorists could have

advocated a tax system that would not promote equality of income but
would redistribute wealth in a more modest fashion, ensuring that all
individuals had basic subsistence income. This approach would have
produced a higher level of utility without reaching the "acme of
socialism."63 Thus, although the utilitarians hesitated to implement a
scheme that equalized incomes, simply exempting the poor from
taxation was not the only policy choice available. Nevertheless, like
tax theorists who used Hobbes's political theory to justify taxation,
the early utilitarians simply advocated an exemption from taxation
but failed to consider the full potential of their underlying principles.
Although early utilitarians focused primarily on the decreasing
marginal utility of income theory to argue for progressity, modern
utilitarians have been less convinced of the validity of this theory
given the difficulty of interpersonal comparisons. Moreover, modern
utilitarians writing in the taxation context are primarily concerned
with the market incentives and disincentives found within the Code.
The graduated tax rate system, it is argued, reduces the market labor
supply, encourages individuals to invest capital in unproductive activities, and forces society to incur costs associated with the administration of the complex rate structure. While tax theorists widely
dispute the extent to which progressivity exacerbates these problems,64 there is no disagreement that the graduated rate system is

the marginal utility of income to all other individuals is impossible to prove. Consequently,
many scholars and theorists committed to progressive taxation have turned elsewhere for
support of the graduated rate system. Many advocates have simply argued that while the
marginal utility of income cannot be pinned down, it remains clear that the rich have a greater
ability to pay than do the poor. While the ability to pay theory clearly exempts individuals at
subsistence levels of income from taxation, it does not necessarily lead to progressivity. A
proportionate tax, for example, that requires high income individuals to pay a greater absolute
amount of income to the government but the same percentage of income as low income

individuals is consistent with the notion that one's ability to pay should be the underlying
principle of the tax laws. Ultimately, some sacrifice theorists have defended progressivity not
on objective findings or logic but on "ethics or aesthetic judgment." See, Simons, Personal
Income Taxation at 18 (cited in note 5).
62. Groves, 9 Nael Tax J. at 33 (cited in note 10) (poor individuals get "infinite utilities"
from each dollar). See also authorities cited in note 61.
63. Seligman, ProgressiveTaxation at 845 (cited in note 2).
64. See Alstott, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 545 (cited in note 14) (recognizing that taxation often
works as a disincentive to work but arguing that "it is essential to distinguish disincentives

from the effects of those disincentives on behavior"); Bankman and Griffith, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at
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inefficient, at least to some degree. These inefficiencies, in turn,
reduce market growth and overall wealth. Because modern utilitarians often view market growth as the key to maximizing overall utility, they have generally opposed progressivity.
The negative effects of the graduated rate structure are related
While an
to the substitution effects produced by taxation. 65
individual's responsiveness to changes in the tax rates are conditioned
on many forces, including personal preferences and social mores, a
number of empirical studies have demonstrated that high marginal
tax rates decrease the time that many individuals are willing to spend
in the waged labor market. 66 Thus, as the level of taxation increases,
the number of market participants willing to remain in the market
decreases. As individuals move out of the wage labor market and into
non-market activities, overall market productivity and aggregate
wealth also decrease. Accordingly, modern utilitarian theorists have
argued that a better approach to taxation would entail proportionate
avoid the inefficiencies
or even regressive marginal tax rates that
67
system.
rate
graduated
the
with
associated

1922-23 & nn.67, 68, 69, 72 (cited in note 2) (describing various approaches for estimating the

elasticity of waged labor and citing to over thirty different empirical studies).
65. In the context of market labor, the extent of the substitution effect is related to an
individual's relative preference for consumption over leisure. Because individuals value both
consumption and leisure, an individual will work only if the value of the additional consumption
is at least as great as the value of the leisure she gives up. Imposing an income tax reduces the
amount of additional consumption an individual will be able to enjoy by working an extra hour.
An individual who is willing to give up an hour of her leisure time for six dollars' worth of
consumption, for example, will only work if her after-tax salary is six dollars. If Congress
imposes an income tax that reduces the individual's after-tax salary to below six dollars, the
individual will refuse to sacrifice an hour of leisure. Thus if the market wage is seven dollars
per hour and Congress imposes a 10% tax, the taxpayer will have $6.30 of post-tax income and
the individual will continue to work. If Congress imposes a 20% tax, however, the taxpayer will
have just $5.60 of after-tax income and will refuse to work in the wage labor market. See note
26 for a further discussion of substitution effects.
66. See M. Killingsworth and J. Heckman, Female Labor Supply in Orley Ashenfelter and
Richard Layer, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics (Elsevier Science, 1986) (noting the high
elasticity of women's labor supply and women's responsiveness to wage decreases). See also
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in
the Code, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 983 (1993) (arguing that women are less committed to the waged
labor force due to cultural mores and family responsibilities and thus have a more elastic labor
supply than men, who tend to be far more committed to market activities); Lawrence Zelenak,
Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 339 (1994) (arguing that the joint return
system does not fit current American attitude and living patterns); J. Penceval, Labor Supply of
Men in Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layer, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics (Elsevier
Science, 1986) (summarizing major empirical studies indicating that the labor supply elasticity
of men is very small and thus unresponsive to taxation).
67. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector at 462 (cited in note 26) (noting that a lumpsum tax produces an income effect rather than the substitution effect produced by a progressive
tax).
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The second market-oriented argument raised by modern utilitarians relates to individual investment activity. Critics of progressivity argue that such rates distort investment behavior by
68
encouraging the movement of capital into tax-favored investments.
Theorists also argue that progressivity encourages individuals to
misappropriate their human capital. High income individuals, it is
argued, will spend significant energy and time seeking unproductive
tax shelters for their professional income rather than engaging their
talents in more productive activities in the open market.69 In other
words, taxpayers will employ their capital for the purpose of avoiding
taxation rather than for more productive activities, ultimately decreasing the level of society's overall economic growth and prosperity.
Finally, progressivity is associated with the perceived complexity of the federal tax system.70 The complex rate structure, in turn,
imposes administrative costs associated with taxpayer time spent on
tax planning and return preparation, the expense of purchasing
professional assistance, as well as the governmental costs of
preventing tax evasion. Arguably, society also incurs these costs
because individuals and government agencies spend time and
resources on difficult legal questions rather than investing in more
productive activities that would enhance society's overall wealth.
The costs associated with the labor supply, the investment of
human capital, and the administration of a complex system have
prompted many utilitarians to call for the repeal of the progressive
marginal rate structure. A more efficient tax system, it is argued,
68, William Vickery, for example, has argued that high marginal rates win encourage
individuals to invest in tax.exempt municipal bonds. This type of investment, he argues, is far
less productive than investment in the private market, where resources are likely to be used far
more efficiently. Vickrey, 20 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 442 (cited in note 9) ("Capital best adapted to
riskbearing and equity investment is diverted to government bonds."). See also Mellon,
Taxation at 170-72 (cited in note 10) (making the same argument in an earlier decade).
69. Charles 0. Galvin and Boris I. Bittker, The Income Tax How Progressive Should It
Be? 18 (American Enterprise Institute, 1969) (The present system tends to prostitute the
talents of our most capable citizens").
70. Because a graduated rate system taxes individuals at various rates depending on their
level of income, identifying the proper taxpayer in any transaction is key to the smooth
operation of the tax system. Identifying the taxpayer responsible for paying the tax, however,
can be quite difficult if family members and business partners attempt to shift income to the
low-bracket individuals, thereby avoiding the high marginal tax rates. Blum and Kalven, The
Uneasy Case at 21-28 (cited in note 7) (discussing the detrimental effects of progression on
economic productivity). Moreover, the progressive rate schedule gives greater significance to
the annual accounting period. If a taxpayer falls into a high tax bracket due to significant
earned and unearned income in one year but drops to a lower tax bracket in the next year due
to decreased income, then the year in which income is recognized becomes extremely
consequential.
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will promote greater economic growth and thus work to the advantage
of all citizens-including the poor. 71 Although the concern for the poor
is often difficult to identify because the efficiency-oriented theorists
simply assume the benefits of growth, 72 the underlying idea is that as
the gross domestic product increases, material wealth and market
73
opportunities also increase for both the rich and the poor.
71. As Amartya Sen has aptly noted, economics is not solely concerned with income and
wealth but also with using these resources as means to significant ends, including the promotion and enjoyment of long and worthwhile lives. Amartya Sen, The Economics of Life and
Death, 268 Sci. Am. 40 (1993).
72. Economic theorists interested in the effect of legal rules on the domestic economy
routinely fail to explain why the government should pursue growth strategies beyond the
tautologous observation that this approach to policymaking maximizes revenue. See, for
example, Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice 67 (Harvard U., 1981) (arguing that freemarket policy is best because it is likely to produce the greatest level of aggregate wealth).
Economists exploring the development of poor countries, however, frequently identify the
underlying aims of markets and growth with regard to material resources. See, for example,
Employment, Growth, and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem (ILO International Labour
Office, 1976). See also Sen, 268 Sci. Am. at 40-50 (cited in note 71) (arguing that policymakers
must keep in mind that the underlying purposes of growth are related to the provision of both
basic needs and overall prosperity).
73. Because all the data bear a close relationship to income, and because income is perceived to be a proxy for all other goods, the GDP and other measures are viewed as worthwhile
indicators of well-being and indicative of the success of social policy. None of the measures,
however, clearly identify what it is we are seeking to produce or to buy. Economists might
argue that there is no purpose in discussing the character of the goods ultimately purchased.
Income is valuable because it enables the individual to buy goods and services according to her
revealed preferences. The nature of the preference is exogenous and, for the most part,
unimportant to the policy of growth. In short, more is always better because it widens the area
of individual choice-regardless of the nature of one's choice. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and
Freedom 7-21 (U. of Chicago, 1962) (arguing that economic arrangements should expand
individual choice and freedom). Wealth, however, must be a proxy for some identifiable good.
One who values money and wealth for more than its instrumental uses simply has a fetish for
"little green paper." Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 242 (Harvard U., 1985) (using
hypothetical market exchange to prove that an increase in social wealth alone does not improve
society unless the wealth is instrumental for obtaining other goods). See also John Kenneth
Galbraith, The Affluent Society 87-88 (Riverside, 1964) (noting three benefits from amassing
wealth).
Nevertheless, economic theorists routinely claim that market-oriented policymaking is
legitimate precisely because of its trickle-down effects. See, for example, Kenneth Hoover and
Raymond Plant, Conservative Capitalism in Britainand the United States 263 (Routledge, 1989)
(noting that free-market theorists argue that individuals living in poverty will gain far more
under a productive and efficient market than through egalitarian or redistributive policies).
Throughout the history of taxation, theorists have argued that efficient tax rules will increase
aggregate market growth, thereby ensuring the poor's access to basic economic resources. Tax
theorists in the 1920s claimed that lower taxes on the wealthy would "solve the housing
problem.., make possible lower freight and passenger rates ... increase the number of jobs
and at the same time advance general prosperity." Mellon, Taxation at 137 (cited in note 10).
Similarly, economic theorists in the 1960s argued that decreasing the marginal tax rates on
wealthy investors would produce economic growth and would "enable millions to enjoy better
lives ... [by] providing more fully both such basic needs as food, clothing and shelter and the
amenities of civilized life--education, medical care, travel, and recreation." The Annual Report
of the Council of Economic Advisors, in James Tobin and Murray Weidenbaum, eds., Two
Revolutions in Economic Policy: The FirstEconomic Reports of PresidentsKennedy and Reagan
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Despite the trenchant efficiency-oriented criticisms and the
view that redistributional programs, of any kind, are more harmful
than helpful, no theorist has ever seriously advocated the head tax,
which is perceived to be the most efficient tax. 74 The head tax would
mandate that each individual pay an identical sum to the fisc, in effect forcing poor individuals to pay a greater percentage of their
income than a wealthy individual. An exclusive concern for efficiency,
therefore, would lead to a steeply regressive tax. Because a head tax
would prevent poor individuals from purchasing everyday necessities,
efficiency-oriented theorists have not proposed a head tax but instead
have proposed proportionate taxation with an exemption for the poor.
Importantly, these theorists have also failed to identify a normative
theory that supports the conclusion that a degressive or proportionate
tax with an exemption for subsistence levels of income is the best and
most ethical tax.75

195-96 (MIT, 1988). And, of course, the supply-side economic theorists argued throughout the
1980s that the benefits of lower tax rates and higher growth would trickle down to all American
citizens. Statement of the Council of Economic Advisors, 1982 Annual Report, in James Tobin
and Murray Weidenbaum, eds., Two Revolutions in Economic Policy: The First Economic
Reports of PresidentsKennedy and Reagan 435-45 (MIT, 1989). See also Bruce E. Moon and
William J. Dixon, Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A Cross National Study, 29 Am.
J. Pol. Sci. 681 (1985) (quoting Ronald Reagan's Budget Director, David Stockman, as saying,
"My Grand Doctrine... is aimed to reverse both the national impoverishment and the rampant
injustice [of being poor]"). In short, economic theorists have viewed growth policies as doing
much more to lift the incomes of the poor and disadvantaged than more direct redistributional
programs. King, Money, Time, & Politics at 192 (sited in note 36) (quoting James Tobin, one of
the architects of Kennedy's economic strategy). King argues that capital and labor, employer
and employee, saver and consumer have all perceived market growth strategies as
advantageous to their own economic position. He notes that even politically left and liberal
legislators have argued that "[i]t is the false friend who leads the poor man to believe that
capital can be unreasonably taxed or soaked without injury to him.... Soak capital and you
soak labor." Id. at 111.
74. Theorists have criticized the head-tax for centuries. Jeremy Bentham has perhaps defined the problems with the tax most clearly, "The individual being unable to pay the tax on
account of his indigence, finds himself subject to grave evils. Instead of inconvenience of 'the
tax, the suffering of privation are experienced; for this reason a capitation tax is bad; because a
man has a head, it does not follow that he has anything else." Bentham, Principlesof the Civil
Code, in II Collected Works at 319 (cited in note 46). See also Jack Straw, Poll Tax Dies but
Haunts Democracy, Independent 22 (Mar. 31, 1993) (providing brief historical account of the
head tax experiment in England).
75. While economic scholars frequently argue that society should not provide direct economic assistance to the poor, some have argued that if society believes the poor have a right to
income, the government should offer a subsidy rather than relying on voluntary contributions.
Milton Friedman, for example, has noted the federal government must avoid intervening in the
free market while at the same time he has argued the government is in the best position to
alleviate poverty in light of free-rider problems. Friedman, Capitalismand Freedom at 190-91
(cited in note 73).
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There is, however, one important exception to modern utilitarians' consensus with regard to the tax treatment of the truly poor. The
British economist, James Mirlees, argued in 1971 that the utilitarian
ethic might call for a more affirmative policy than the exemption that
traditional tax theorists had previously considered. In his article, An
Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,76 Mirlees
argued that a utilitarian calculus should lead to a tax structure that
makes the poor economically better off post-taxation. Mirlees, in
effect, seeks to revive the early utilitarian argument that focused on
the decreasing marginal utility of income. Put differently, Mirlees
argues that taxation should accomodate both market concerns and the
utility the poor gain from an increase in income. American economic
and tax theorists, however, have virtually ignored the redistributive
potential of Mirlees's work, focusing instead on various other aspects
of his model. Indeed, while Mirlees's work has won international
acclaim, only two American legal theorists have used Mirlees's work
77
to explore the possibility of tax-based transfers to the poor.
Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith look to Mirlees's work
to challenge the traditional assumption that the Code can offer
nothing more than an exemption from taxation to the truly poor.
Bankman and Griffith argue the equity and efficiency of the tax
system should not be considered in isolation, but in conjunction with
the transfer system. Although they raise the possibility that the tax
laws could provide a cash transfer or (or a demogrant) to the poor,78
Bankman and Griffith fail to explore this proposition. Indeed, their
primary focus is on the claim that progressive taxation is inefficient
and costly to society. 79 The importance of their article ultimately lies
not with their exploration of any positive rights the poor might have,
but rather with their argument that progressivity can be attained
without significant market inefficiencies.

76. Mirlees, 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. at 175 (cited in note 14).
77. James Mirlees won the 1996 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science for his advancements in the theory of asymmetric information-or the problems that arise when two
parties have different interests and different information. It is this aspect of his work that has
sparked a cottage industry of literature investigating informational problems. See Secrets and
the Prize, 341 Economist 86 (Oct. 12, 1996) (noting that Mirlees's argument for redistributing
wealth has never been seriously explored while his insights on assymetric information have
gained widespread notice and have been applied in many other fields). See, for example, Bengt
Holmstron, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 Bell J. Econ. 74 (1979) (using Mirlees's work on

asymetric information to explore the role of imperfect information in principal-agent
relationships).
78.
79.

Bankman and Griffith, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1949-60 (cited in note 2).
These claims are explored in notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
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Bankman and Griffith identify the work disincentives inherent
in the graduated rate stucture and explore alternative policy options
that avoid this negative impact while preserving progressivity. Using
Mirlees's work, they argue that Congress should tax the poor at high
levels and that any regressivity occurring under such a system should
be offset by a demogrant or cash tranfer to the poor. The authors,
however, do not investigate whether the demogrant should do more
than offset the high tax burden, thereby putting the poor into a better
economic position post-taxation. Instead, Bankman and Griffith
simply note that the amount of the demogrant awarded to the poor
depends on one's theory of distributional fairness; a utilitarian
seeking a distribution of income that maximizes overall wealth might
transfer less than an egalitarian seeking to enhance the well-being of
the poorest individuals in society.8 0 The authors, therefore, raise the
possibility that the poor might have a positive right to income and
thus push tax theorists to address unexplored questions. Yet they fail
entirely to investigate this difficult question themselves.
Utilitarian tax theory, therefore, has taken a number of
different analytical turns over the course of the last century. Early
utilitarians focused on the decreasing marginal utility of income in
arguing for progressivity. Although early scholars noted this theory
of utility should lead policymakers to equalize income, none advocated
this position. Instead, the early utilitarians argued that policymakers
should tax the relatively wealthy at a rate far below 100% and should
simply exempt the poor from taxation rather than affecting a large
scale redistribution of income. Modern utilitarians have turned away
from the marginal utility of income theory and have focused on the
efficiency costs of taxation. Like the early utilitarian theorists, the
modern theorists have also refused to consider the full potential of
their underlying principles. Although the most efficient tax is the
head tax, modern utilitarians have not advocated this in light of its
perceived unfairness to the poor.

80. Bankman and Griffith, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1959-60 (cited in note 2) (noting that distributive theories of justice could lead to different tax rates and different levels of demogrants
and arguing that the Rawlsian theory is unlikely to have a large impact on policymaking
because of its extreme egalitarianism).
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3. Modern Social Contract Theory
Although utilitarianism has been the primary ethical foundation of the tax laws throughout the twentieth century, recent tax
theorists have sought to devise an ethical approach to policymaking
that considers not only aggregate welfare, but also the welfare of
individual citizens. Accordingly, tax theorists have turned to John
Rawls's work, A Theory of Justice.sl
Rawls argues that social structures are just only if they are
based on impartial and impersonal criteria. Or in Rawlsian terms,
social structures are just if they are based on principles chosen behind
a "veil of ignorance." 82 According to Rawls, rational individuals acting
without knowledge of their place in society, their class position, or
their social status (that is, behind the veil of ignorance) would not
accept utilitarianism or the idea that policymaking should maximize
the algebraic sum of utilities. "It hardly seems likely," Rawls argues,
"that persons who view themselves as equals, entitled to press their
claims upon one another, would agree to a principle which may
require lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater
sum of advantages enjoyed by others." 3 In short, no rational
individual would sacrifice her own life or her ability to survive even if
that choice maximized overall utility under the utilitarian calculus.
Instead, Rawls argues that rational individuals would bargain
for a social contract that first requires equality of liberty for all individuals and second allows social and economic inequalities only if they
ultimately work to the advantage of the least well-off member of society. Put differently, the social contract first mandates that the state
protect the basic liberties of all individuals at all times. Second, when
choosing between a policy that promotes inequality and one that
promotes perfect equality, the state must choose the one that
advantages the worst-off individual.84 Unlike the utilitarians, who
are focused on individuals' moral obligation to maximize overall utility even at the expense of their own interests, Rawls focuses on the

81. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (cited in note 10).
82. Id. at 264.
83. Id. at 266.
84. Specifically, Rawls puts forward two principles of justice:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: Social and Economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)
reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and
offices open to all.
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rights of individuals under the social contract. The right to basic
liberties and the right to equality of opportunity is key for Rawls.
The implication of Rawls's theory of rights for taxation, an area
of the law fundamentally concerned with a citizen's obligation to the
state, initially might appear awkward. By identifying and understanding the extent of an individual's rights, however, tax theorists
are in a far better position to shape obligations under the Code in a
manner that avoids violating those rights. Rights and obligations,
therefore, are integrally related for purposes of taxation.
According to Rawls's theory, any policy that impinges upon an
individual's right to equal liberty is problematic. Because the progressive marginal tax rates mandate that the wealthy pay more than
the poor, progressivity arguably impinges upon the rights of the
wealthy to a greater extent than on the rights of the poor and thus
represents questionable social policy. At the same time, Rawls argues
that if liberty and equality are to have any meaning, each individual
must have access to basic economic resources or "primary goods."
Redistributive measures and progressive taxation, therefore, are
legitimate if they work "to correct the distribution of wealth and to
prevent concentrations of power detrimental to political liberty and
equality of opportunity."" Unlike utilitarianism, which supports any
distribution of wealth that works to maximize overall welfare, Rawls's
theory of justice is concerned with the least well-off individuals in
society and their right to equal liberty and opportunity. 86
Using Rawls's theory of rights, Charles O'Kelly has attempted
to address the rights and responsibilities of both high- and low-income
individuals.87 O'Kelly argues that Congress should pursue a system of
taxation that impinges only minimally on the liberty interests of successful market participants but at the same time advantages the least
well-off individuals in society.88 A flat tax arguably would recognize
the obligation of each member of society to contribute her income and
effort to the public good but would not disproportionately sacrifice the
85. Id. at 277-78.
86. Rawls's theory has been extensively criticized both inside and outside of the legal
literature. See, for example, Amartya K Sen, Resources, Values and Development 279-80
(Harvard U., 1985) (providing a brief critique of Rawls's work for failing to accommodate the
special needs of the disabled, poor, and the ill). See also Mari Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence
and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16
N. Mex. L. Rev. 613 (1986) (arguing that Rawls's theory of justice is flawed for its failure to
"explore real-life potential of humankind in a concrete context").
87. O'Kelly, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 727-55 (cited in note 10).
88. Id. at 739-55.
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liberty interests of one citizen for the benefit of others. The validity of
the flat tax, according to O'Kelly, rests on the fact that each taxpayer
would pay precisely the same portion of her income to the state and
thus the costs of taxation could not be disproportionate. At the same
time, O'Kelly proposes a personal exemption equal to the income
needed for basic subsistence.89 The personal exemption arguably
recognizes society's commitment to ensuring access to the basic income necessary to participate in the democratic process. More importantly, O'Kelly argues the tax exemption expresses the view that
society values the contribution made by low-income individuals to the
social product and recognizes this contribution entitles them to receive at least a minimum wage by virtue of that work. 9° Through his
flat tax/basic income exemption proposal, therefore, O'Kelly seeks to
protect the liberty interests of both the wealthy and the poor pursuant
to Rawls's rights oriented theory of distributive justice. 91
Like the early social contract theorists and the utilitarians,
O'Kelly would limit the Tax Code's potential to advantage the poor by
advocating only an exemption from taxation, not by providing any
affirmative benefits. O'Kelly's failure to advocate affirmative benefits
for the poor is particularly unfounded because Rawls's theory of
justice expressly calls for the state, and the tax laws in particular, to
provide assistance to the poor by highlighting the relationship
between meaningful participation in a democracy and access to basic
subsistence income and "primary goods." 92

Yet O'Kelly fails to

consider what the tax laws could or should do beyond offering an
exemption to the poor. 93 This cramped interpretation of a theory that
potentially could lead to much greater intervention reflects the deeply
ingrained notion that the most taxation can do for the poor is to
exclude them from the scope of the laws. At the same time, it reflects
the idea that taxation raises serious questions with regard to the
rights and responsibilities of the relatively wealthy, but not with
regard to the poor.

89. Id. at 751-55.
90. Id. at 747.
91. Id. at 751.
92. See Joseph H. Carens, Rights and Duties in an EgalitarianSociety, 14 Pol. Theory 31,
39 (1986) (noting that it is puzzling that Rawls himself does not advocate a steeply progressive
tax system with redistribution in all circumstances).
93. See Stern, 6 J. of Pub Econ. at 123 (cited in note 14) (noting that with a Rawlsian

social welfare function-where the only concern is with the poorest individual, taxpayers should
be taxed at a rate of 80% with a guaranteed minimum income equal to about 38% of the median
income). See also Atkinson, Public Economics in Action at 29-33 (cited in note 14) (arguing that

Rawls's work would support a right to basic income).
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4. Entitlement Theory of Property
Entitlement theories of distributive justice also focus on the
rights of individuals. Like social contract theory, there are many
variants of the entitlement theory, each with unique policy implications. Entitlement theorists, however, generally argue that a person
is deserving because of some action she has taken or some trait she
possesses. 94 A modern version of the entitlement theory is Robert
Nozick's conception of property rights, under which a person has the
right to property acquired in uncoerced exchanges with others.
Nozick argues that government laws taking (or taxing) property obtained in a fair market exchange amounts to theft or, even worse,
involuntary servitude under the 13th Amendment. "Taking the earnings of n number of hours," he argues, "is like forcing a person to work
n hours for another person" and thus is forced labor.95
While Nozick's argument naturally leads to the conclusion that
any taxation is constitutionally infirm, his expansive view of entitlement has never gained widespread support.96 Instead, theorists who
advocate a version of Nozick's entitlement theory have argued that to
the extent that taxation is a necessary evil, policymakers must avoid
disproportionately infringing upon any person's economic gain. In
short, because all individuals are entitled to the property they acquire
through fair market exchange, there is no basis for unequal treatment
under the Tax Code. 97 Accordingly, tax theorists adhering to the
entitlement theory of property argue Congress must impose identical
tax burdens on all individuals to avoid violating the rights of one
individual to a greater extent than another. This view has led some
to argue for a proportionate or flat tax rate. Others, however, have
argued Congress must take an identical sum from each citizen, not
simply an identical percentage of their income. A noteworthy aspect
of theorists' use of Nozick's work is their unwillingness to take the
position that Congress must impose identical utility costs on all

94. Bankman and Griffith, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1915 (cited in note 2) (providing short but
helpful descriptions of the various contemporary theories of justice).
95. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 169-70 (cited in note 6).
96. Even Nozick believes in the minimal state and thus would agree the state must have
access to revenue. Id.
97. See Schoenblum, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol. at 258-271 (cited in note 10) (advocating a head
tax). See also O'Kelly, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 735-744 (cited in note 10) (arguing that taxpayers
have an entitlement to a flat tax).
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citizens. This argument could, of course, lead to a progressive tax
rate structure as the early utilitarians noted. 98
Like all other tax theorists, however, no entitlement theorist
has advocated that Congress subject the truly poor to the same tax
burden as the wealthy. Theorists exploring the possibility of a
Nozickean tax structure argue the legislature should adopt a head tax
with an exemption to account for those at a subsistence level 99 or a
proportionate tax with an exemption for the truly disadvantaged.10
Thus even individuals strongly opposed to any form of redistribution
contend that the poor should pay less or nothing at all to the common
good, confirming the notion that the government is morally and
politically justified in adopting some variant of a graduated rate
structure.
That poor individuals might be entitled to more than just a tax
exemption under Nozick's theory of entitlement, however, is suggested by the fact that Nozick leaves open the question of whether
"catastrophic moral horrors" provide the moral grounds for ensuring
access to basic material goods.10 1 Since the only resource that many
individuals legitimately possess under Nozick's theory is their labor
power, which may turn out to be unsaleable in the market, Nozick's
2
theory most likely gives way to situations that result in starvation.10
At the same time, "once it is admitted that consequences can be important in judging what rights we do or do not morally have, surely
the door is quite open for taking a less narrow view of rights."10 3 Tax
theorists advocating some form of Nozick's entitlement theory, however, have never explored these arguments. Instead, they have focused their attention on individuals above the subsistence level of
income and have emphatically argued that policymakers must avoid
violating the rights of one individual to a greater extent than the
10 4
rights of another through disparate levels of taxation.

98. See Nancy Staudt and Mariam Thalos, Nozick's Theory of Justice and the Progressive
MarginalRate Structure(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Author).
99. Schoenblum, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol. at 270 (cited in note 10)
100. James A. Dorn, Introduction: The Principles and Politics of Tax Reform, 5 Cato J. 361,
380 (1985) (noting that policymakers advancing entitlement theories of justice advocate modified flat tax programs that call for "some progressivity" to account for the truly poor).
101. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopiaat 79-80 (cited in note 6).
102. Sen, Resources, Values and Development at 312 (cited in note 86).
103. Id. See also John Deigh, On Rights and Responsibilities, 7 L. and Phil. 147, 168-69
(1988) (arguing that the Lockean right to property is not necessarily violated by federal law
ensuring basic subsistence income if the law is written to account for circumstances that are
unexpected and unaccounted for in the Lockean regime).
104. See Schoenblum, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol. at 258-71 (cited in note 10); Dorn, 5 Cato. J. at
380 (cited in note 100).
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Countless theorists have criticized Nozick's entitlement theory
of justice. Critics argue that the idea that individuals are entitled to
the full extent of their market gains ignores what most citizens recognize-that the level of their material well-being is inextricably linked
with the goods and services produced by others and depends upon the
success of the national economy. 10 5 Society and not just the individual, therefore, should be entitled to market gains.
Barbara Fried, for example, demonstrates the manner in
which Nozick's theory of entitlement obscures difficult issues related
to market price and surplus value. To make her case, Fried assumes
a hypothetical taxpayer that has significant market gains. The hypothetical taxpayer purchased a vacant parcel of land located in a
sparsely populated county near New York City. Because of economic,
demographic and other social changes, the value of the real estate
increased 500-fold and produced significant gain upon a sale. Fried
argues that while the entitlement theory would legitimate a return of
the original cost of the land plus a fair return on the cost (for risk,
perhaps), it is far from clear that any appreciation beyond that
amount rightfully belongs to the seller. Indeed, Fried argues societyat-large might be just as entitled as the seller to the benefits resulting
from scarcity of the supply of land located near New York City,
changing tastes, and available material wealth. Because society has
acted as a silent partner in conferring benefits, Fried argues that
society also might be justified in sharing the gains of the
transaction. 0 6 In short, while Nozick contends that progressivity
amounts to society stealing from the wealthy, a theorist could argue
that progressive taxation assures the wealthy cannot cheat society.
Fried makes the case that wealthy individuals are advantaged
by social structures and thus are not necessarily entitled to the full
extent of their material gains simply because they obtain gains
through a fair market transfer. Fried, however, fails to consider the
flip side of her argument. Perhaps economic, demographic, and social
105. O'Kelly, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 737 (cited in note 10). See also Carens, 14 Pol. Theory at
40 (cited in note 92) (arguing that if income differences were purely compensatory for hard
work, there would be no disadvantaged position in society and no envy problems because people
with more income would not really be better off in light of the sacrifice they made to obtain the
income).
106. Barbara Fried, Wilt Chamberlain Revisited: Nozick's Justice on Transfer and the
Problem of Market-Based Distribution, 24 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 226, 235-45 (1995). See also
Carens, 14 Pol. Theory at 41 (cited in note 92) (noting that high incomes are due more to
societal demand than to hard work and arguing on this basis that progressive taxation would
not deprive individuals of their hard-earned and deserved income).
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change have disadvantagedthe poor--creating a possible entitlement
to payment from society. For example, assume a hypothetical individual who was born into unfortunate social and economic circumstances. Because of these early, undeserved misfortunes, the individual has failed to adopt society's standards for hygiene, has always
been a bit disheveled, has no education, and has had no ability to
support his basic need for food, clothing, health care, and shelter. In
short, the individual is not only homeless and in poverty, but his very
survival is at risk. Fried's argument ought to suggest that society's
peculiar taste for clean, neat, and extensively educated individuals
may have prevented this hypothetical individual from attaining
minimal living standards. Just as society contributed to the wealth of
the land-holder in Fried's example, perhaps society has contributed to
the unfortunate position of this hypothetical individual and thus
should provide a cash transfer or a demogrant.
Fried intended only to address the question of how to tax
relatively wealthy individuals and not the question of the proper tax
treatment of individuals living at subsistence levels.10 7 Various other

theorists, however, have also identified market imperfections as
playing a significant role in the production of wealth and have argued
that an individual's entitlement to the full extent of her market gains
is questionable in light of these imperfections. Unlike Fried, these
theorists have advocated a specific tax program that taxes individuals
with income at progressive levels and that exempts the poor from
taxation, but have advocated nothing more affirmative. 01 8 The critics
of the entitlement theory, like all other tax theorists, therefore, have
failed to investigate the possibility that poor individuals might have a

107. Fried, however, appears to be aware of this question. She notes, for example, that
rent theorists have also ignored the question of how to treat losses. "If investors are entitled to
no more than compensation for their sacrifice," she asks, "are they also entitled to no less? If so,
then the government should protect losers to the extent that assets fall in value from their
historic cost either by artificially keeping price levels high enough to generate a fair return on
costs or by reimbursing their losses." Although this question arises in a different context, it is
arguably similar to my example in the text. Fried, Robert Hale and Progressive Legal
Economics 77 (cited in note 56).
108. See Michael J. Graetz, To Praisethe Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 Yale L. J. 259, 27475 (1983) (arguing that market distributions are due not only to hard work but also to fickle
markets, joint efforts, societal conditions, and pure luck and thus the assumption that each
person is entitled to keep what she earns on the market is therefore in serious doubt under any
theory). See also Graetz, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 532-33 (cited in note 10) (arguing that any tax
reform should maintain the existing progressivity of the Code which incorporates an exemption
for the extremely low levels of income). But see Michael Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of
Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851, 906 (1987) (arguing that the social
security system is biased against the poor and briefly commenting in his conclusion that perhaps the poor should be exempt from employment taxes while still getting the benefit).
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right to a cash transfer or a demogrant under the same theory that
justifies progressive taxation for the wealthy.
C. Summary
Tax theorists have developed notions of horizontal and vertical
equity as the standards for measuring the fairness of the tax laws.
Horizontal fairness, however, can play only a small, almost insignificant, role in tax policy, while the concept of vertical equity is key
for tax policymaking and has been at the center of controversy for
over a century. The debate over vertical equity has, in turn, centered
on the legitimacy of progressive marginal tax rates.
Theorists in a wide range of disciplines have entered the progressivity debate, each contending their underlying political, moral, or
economic theory resolves the difficult questions at hand. Early social
contract theorists and utilitarians focused on the obligations of an
individual to contribute to the common good, while modern social
contract theorists and entitlement theorists have focused on individual rights in order to identify the proper tax structure. Each group of
theorists has set forth competing marginal rate systems that are intended to govern the tax obligations of individuals with income above
the subsistence level. Despite their contending arguments and policy
proposals, however, theorists have reached a remarkable agreement
with regard to the tax treatment of poor individuals. Theorists have
almost universally agreed that policymakers must avoid imposing tax
costs on society's disadvantaged individuals by offering an exemption
from the tax laws. Although theorists have unanimously concluded
that the poor deserve an exemption from taxation, they have not
followed their own logic to the conclusion that the poor might deserve
positive benefits as well. Thus the exemption from taxation is
valuable, but it falls far short of what many of the theorists could
have concluded given their underlying principles. This surprising
agreement among theorists who are deeply divided on the underlying
aims and goals of policymaking raises the question of what shared
underlying assumptions have led them to this limited policy proposal?
The next two Parts seek to bring to the surface the embedded
assumptions found in traditional tax theory with regard to the rights
and responsibilities of the poor. In Part III, I explore three possible
reasons for tax theorists' neglect of the positive rights of the poor. I
argue that not only are tax scholars unable to justify their failure to
consider positive rights, but also that the current progressivity debate
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imposes hidden costs upon both society and the poor. In Part IV, I
turn to the assumptions found in traditional tax theory with regard to
the responsibilities of the poor. I first argue that theorists have
assumed that poor individuals have no responsibility to contribute to
the state. I then explore the hidden costs associated with this
assumption, and explain how policymakers might use the Tax Code to
impose responsibilities upon the poor without further marginalizing
them.

III. THE MISSING DEBATE OVER PosITIvE RIGHTS
Traditional tax theorists implicitly agree that individuals at
subsistence levels of income should have, at the minimum, the
privilege or the negative right to be free from coercive interference by
the government, at least with regard to taxation. 01 9 It is surprising
that theorists have not explored more thoroughly any positive rights
the poor might have in light of their underlying principles and ethical
mandates.
Many of the theories, taken to their own logical
conclusion, could justify a positive right to income. If traditional tax
theorists have purposefully failed to consider the positive rights of the
poor, the obvious question is-why? One reason might be related to
the notion that tax policy involves the imposition of liabilities,not the
award of rights. The question of positive rights, therefore, should be
left to the welfare debate which largely takes place outside of the
federal taxation context. A second reason for tax theorists' neglect of
positive rights could be related to the existence of the deductions,
credits, and exemptions that arguably protect any positive rights the
poor might have. In short, because the political process has addressed
satisfactorily the question of the poor's positive rights, traditional tax
theorists have focused only on the relatively wealthy. Finally, tax
theorists might argue that they have not ignored positive rights, but
they have pursued an alternative strategy altogether for assuring
economic security. Rather than specific subsidies that ensure a

109. Individual property rights are generally grounded in the "negative claim" to be let
alone and to hold, keep and enjoy as opposed to "positive claims" to active assistance in
obtaining or enjoying the use of wealth. Frank Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and
ConstitutionalProperty, in Ellen Frankel Paul and Howard Dickman, eds., Liberty, Property,
and the Future of ConstitutionalDevelopment 128 (State U. of New York, 1990). See also
Stephen Holmes, Passionsand Constraint. On the Theory of Liberal Democracy 311-12, n.8 (U.
of Chicago, 1995) (describing negative liberty "as the absence of coercive interference, in
voluntary social interactions, by the government or other wielders of power" and positive liberty
as "collective self-government").
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minimum income for the poor, theorists have focused on the
possibility of using the Tax Code as a means for promoting market
growth and productivity. The benefits of market growth are assumed
to trickle down to the poor and are often assumed to provide benefits
far greater than any direct subsidy ever could.
A. Assuming Others Will Solve the Problem
Tax theorists' failure to explore fully the positive rights of the
poor might be due to the notion that taxation involves the imposition
of liabilities and not the award of positive rights. Thus while
resolving the question of whether the poor have an affirmative claim
to additional income is an important question, it is arguably not for
tax theorists to determine. In short, traditional tax theorists might
acknowledge their analytical oversight, but would argue their
approach should not be objectionable because theorists can and do
explore positive economic rights within the context of the social
welfare laws.
While this explanation for tax theorists' narrow focus on the
rights of relatively wealthy individuals might seem persuasive-this
approach to taxation theory imposes serious, hidden costs upon
society, and poor individuals in particular. First, social welfare
subsidies are funded largely through the revenue obtained under the
tax laws. Accordingly, if tax scholars have limited relatively wealthy
individuals' duty to pay taxes-they have also circumscribed the
Second, even if
possibility of funding social welfare subsidies.
policymakers set the marginal tax rates high enough to fund fully
basic income for all individuals, separating the discussion of wealthy
individuals' rights (in the taxation context) from poor individuals'
rights (in the welfare context) works to further marginalize the poor.
The way in which traditional tax theory works to limit the
positive rights of the poor can easily be demonstrated. As Wesley
Hohfeld argued decades ago, any time the state confers an advantage
or imposes a disadvantage on a certain citizen, it necessarily and
simultaneously creates a vulnerability or a benefit on the part of
another.11° In the Hohfeldian lexicon, both private individuals and the

110. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judical Reasoning, 23 Yale L. J. 16 (1913). See alsb Joseph William Singer, Property Law:
Rules, Policies, and Practices 163 (Little, Brown, 1993) ("Any time the state confers an
advantage on some citizen, it necessarily simultaneously creates a vulnerability on the part of
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government have a duty to respect an individual's rights and entitlements.'
Thus, the "logical relationship between rights and duties
makes clear that while an owner's set of rights may increase his security, and thus his own personal sense of liberty, the duties so created
necessarily restrict the freedom of others. Every question about pri2
vate property is therefore also a question about public restraint."
Under a Hohfeldian analysis, poor individuals' freedom from
taxation naturally leads to the conclusion that individuals above
subsistence levels of income are liable for the costs associated with
the provision of public goods and services. A poor individual's right to
subsistence levels of income obtained through her own private
transactions, therefore, creates an obligation upon wealthier
individuals to pay the full cost of public goods. Stated in yet another
way, poor citizens' right to retain all of their income leads to the
conclusion that the government and the wealthy have a duty to
respect that right. Thus, given the legitimacy of the current system of
taxation, individuals living above subsistence levels of income will be
obligated to contribute a portion of their property to the greater social
good.
The policy choice of exempting the poor from taxation,
therefore, simultaneously limits the rights and entitlements of
relatively wealthy individuals.
At the same time, traditional tax theorists' analysis of wealthy
individuals' rights and obligations imposes hidden constraints and
limitations on the poor, and in effect, decides what the poor have no
right to claim. Indeed, virtually every group of tax theorists discussed
in Part II above, imposed unstated constraints upon the poor.
Consider the utilitarian ethic, which mandates that social policies
promote the greatest good for the greatest number. The early
utilitarian principles could have led theorists to conclude that
Congress should take, through taxation, all income above the mean
for redistribution to those below the mean.'13 Under a pure utilitarian

others."); Carl Wellman, Welfare Rights 8-11 (Rowman and Littlefield, 1982) (arguing that
Hohfeld's analysis both reveals and obscures the complexities of property rights).
111. See Wendy Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright. The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1343, 1357 (1989) (arguing
that the right to exclude and the right against interference find support in the Fifth
Amendmenfs Takings Clause).
112. Id. at 1343. As Walter Wheeler Cook (the editor of Hohfeld's book) has noted, the
value of Hohfeld's work is that it enables (forces?) one to examine a situation "first from the
point of view of one person and then from that of the other." Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning 10 (Greenwood, 1966). See
also Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Property 15-36 (Cambridge U., 1990) (providing a useful
explanation of the value and shortcomings of Hohfeld's vocabulary).
113. See notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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ethic, this scheme would promote the greatest utility for the greatest
number. Despite the policy implication of the utilitarian calculus, no
theorist has supported this type of tax-based redistribution. Instead,
tax theorists have worried about market incentives and thus have
proposed marginal tax rates far below 100% and have not advocated a
wide-scale redistribution to the poor (except to the extent that the
poor benefit from public goods and services without having paid for
them). The conclusion that the wealthy have no obligation to pay tax
at a rate of 100%, in Hohfeldian terminology, means that the poor and
society have no right to equality of income.
Moreover, while both Rawls and Nozick have argued that the
state must avoid impinging upon individual rights and liberties, both
authors plausibly could be interpreted as tolerating an affirmative
claim to economic security even if that claim infringes upon the liberty interests of those who would be called upon to satisfy it. Most
tax theorists using modern social contract and entitlement theories,
however, have expressed far greater sympathy for a wealthy
individual's liberty interests and have advocated low and uniform tax
rates and no cash transfers to the poor. By seeking to protect the
rights of the wealthy and by refusing to impose the obligation upon
the wealthy to support wealth transfer programs, theorists have
denied the poor a right to subsistence income that cannot be obtained
in the private market. If the wealthy have the right to keep their
income, neither the poor nor the state have the right to claim it for
redistribution.
Of course, theorists might argue that the tax rates on the relatively wealthy could still be set high enough to finance the welfare
payments to individuals outside the context of taxation without necessarily violating the principles and ethical mandates to which they
adhere. Theorists have not taken a position on the absolute level of
revenue obtained by the laws, but rather have only addressed the
problem of treating differently situated individuals differently under
the marginal rate structure. Put differently, many theorists might
not object to higher marginal tax rates, so long as each taxpayer is
treated identically under the Code. Indeed, that tax theorists have
not hindered any potential positive claim to income is reflected by the
114
social welfare programs that provide for those in need.
114. While poor individuals gain only a tax exemption under the federal tax rules, they are
potentially entitled to additional benefits under various other laws. None of these programs,
however, guarantee subsistence income for all individuals. Access to many of the poverty relief
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In effect, tax theorists have not awarded a right but they may
have reserved for the poor the privilege to go elsewhere to obtain basic
needs. But in Hohfeldian terminology, if the wealthy have a right to
keep their income and they have no obligation to subsidize the cost of
their basic needs, then the poor do not have the privilege to seek
economic security even in other forums. 115 In short, the poor only
have the privilege to go to the state for economic assistance if the
wealthy do not have a right to all of their income after incurring the
cost of public goods (except redistribution).116
programs, for example, is tied to one's attachment to the labor force. Failure to participate in
the market (or to be married to a waged laborer), therefore, prevents one from benefiting from
old age pensions and Medicare. Kathleen A. Kost and Frank W. Munger, FoolingAll the People
Some of the Time: 1990's Welfare Reform and the Exploitationof American Values, 4 Va. J. Soc.
Pol. & L. 3, 13 (1996). Although additional programs, such as the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, the Food Stamp program, and Medicaid provide financial support based on
need, none guarantee subsistence levels of income. Indeed, even considering these transfer
programs, 15.1% of American citizens were living in poverty in 1993. U.S. Bureau of the
Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 1996 at 472, table 730 (U.S. G.P.O., 1996).
Richard Epstein argues the current approach to redistribution is remarkably unfair because
it imposes costs upon a limited number of individuals rather than society at large. Epstein
notes two examples of this perceived problem. First, rent control systems often deny the
landlord the power to increase rent because of the weak financial condition of the poor. Second,
federal legislation has mandated that employers purchase health and life insurance for the
victims of AIDS. Although Epstein doesn't entirely dismiss the notion that society may want to
provide these basic needs to the poor and disadvantaged, he argues if the public at large wishes
to create a welfare system, it should fund these programs through federal taxation rather than
by forcing the costs upon certain private individuals. Richard Epstein, Takings: Of Maginot
Lines and Constitutional Compromises, in Ellen Frankel Paul and Howard Dickman, eds.,
Liberty, Property,and the Futureof ConstitutionalDevelopment 173, 193 (State U. of New York,

1990).

115. Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions at 43-44 (cited in note 112) ("To the extent
that the defendants have privileges the plaintiffs have no rights; and, conversely, to the extent
that the plaintiffs have rights the defendants have no privileges ('no-privilege' equals duty of
opposite tenor)."). As another commentator has stated,
Suppose A., owner and possessor of a chattel, tells B. that he may take the chattel if he
can do so, but that A. will do all he can to stop B. The permission thus given by A. to B.
has as its consequence the destruction of B.'s duty to refrain from taking the chattel and
confers upon him the privilege of taking it. It does not, however, give B. a right (in the
strict sense) to take it, i.e., it does not place A. under a duty to let B. take it.
Walter Wheeler Cook, Privilegesof Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27 Yale L. J. 779, 787
(1918).
116. As Barbara Fried points out, however, failure to tax the wealthy does not necessarily
give rise to a "right," but simply may reflect a concern for incentives. Nevertheless, refusing to
tax the wealthy, for any reason, implicitly denies the poor a claim to basic income. Of course,
one possible way that the interests of both the wealthy and the poor could be satisfied is
through lower rates which spark market activities, ultimately leading to the government coffers
being filled with revenue. This is precisely what the economist Arthur B. Laffer argued in the
1980s. Arthur Laffer, Government Exactions and Revenue Deficiencies, 1 Cato J. 1,1-21 (1981)
(asserting that decreased levels of taxation will increase government revenue up to a certain
point beyond which increased taxation decreases government revenue because of the
disincentives imposed on work and investment activities). Laffer argued that the tax rate had
far exceeded the point at which the government could attain maximum revenue and thus a tax
cut would actually increase revenue. The argument, however, proved to be wrong: the 1980
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Moreover, if tax theorists are willing to accommodate a positive right to income, it is surprising that none have explored the idea
in any detail. Indeed, tax theorists uniformly have refused to propose
tax reform that ensures basic income for all citizens even though each
of their underlying theories could easily be interpreted as mandating
such a policy. Accordingly, it is far more likely that traditional tax
theorists do not believe the poor are entitled to anything beyond a
negative right to be free from coercive taxation. That the social welfare laws offer some income security to the poor simply suggests that
traditional tax theorists have failed to convince policymakers that the
wealthy have a right to retain their income and no duty to subsidize
redistribution. The disturbing aspect of tax theorists' limited view on
the rights of the poor is that they have steadfastly refused to state it
expressly-thus avoiding a serious debate on this difficult question in
the context of taxation.
Regardless of whether tax theorists have intended to limit
positive rights or not, there are good reasons for investigating the
rights and duties of both the wealthy and the poor in a single forum
rather than in two separate contexts (that is, the tax laws and the
social welfare laws). While explicitly merging the debate over the
rights and duties of the poor with that of the wealthy might not
substantively change the underlying policy proposals, it might
alleviate the social costs of focusing only upon wealthy individuals'
rights in the tax context and poor individuals' rights in the context of
the welfare laws.
Leaving these questions to be debated in separate contexts
contributes to the false perception that policymaking accords an unfair advantage to the poor. Consider, for example, the widespread
notion that the welfare laws give the poor free handouts while at the
same time failing to consider thoroughly the rights of the wealthy.
Put differently, the welfare debate has led to the false conclusion that
society is unfairly prioritizing the interests of the poor in social policymaking. As the traditional scholarly debate in taxation conclusively
demonstrates, however, political, economic, and moral theorists have
all given extensive and serious consideration to the rights and entitlements of the relatively wealthy. Indeed, the debate has thus far

Reagan cuts ultimately expanded the federal deficit as never before. Anthony S. Campagna,
U.S. National Economic Policy, 1917-1985 at 501, 528-29 (Praeger, 1987). Moreover, Laffer's
argument would not appeal to rights-based theorists who would not support using the increased
revenue for redistributive purposes.
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virtually ignored the rights and entitlements of the poor except with
regard to their negative right not to be further impoverished by the
tax system. Merging the discussion of the rights and obligations of
the poor with the discussion of the rights and obligations of the
wealthy would enable society to see that the interests of both are and
should be considered in social policymaking. 117
As Thomas Ross has noted, merging the institutions that
award benefits and impose obligations would subject both the wealthy
and the poor to the same level of administrative oversight. In light of
the current view that poor individuals are likely to cheat and defraud
the federal government, policymakers assume the welfare system
must be implemented and monitored on the substantial possibility of
fraud. 1 8 Tax laws, of course, also give wealthy individuals substantial opportunities to cheat the government. Taxpayers can and do
easily avoid reporting income and exaggerate deductions to avoid
paying their taxes. Yet tax fraud is not viewed as so systemic and
substantial that it necessitates special monitoring beyond the threat
of an audit.119 In short, structuring one institution to award rights to
the poor and another to accord rights to the wealthy allows society to
view the poor as undeserving individuals intent on hustling the system while the relatively wealthy are viewed as productive and honest
20
members of society-assumptions that are entirely unwarranted.

117. See David T. Ellwood, Poor Support: Poverty in the American Family 115 (Basic
Books, 1988) (asserting that integrating the social welfare programs into the Tax Code will
reduce the stigma and isolation associated with welfare); Theda Skocpol, Targeting Within
Universalism" Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in the United States, in Christopher
Jenks and Paul E. Peterson, eds., The Urban Underclass 411, 431 (Brookings Institute, 1991)
(asserting that public assistance is a more sustainable program if incorporated into the "income
tax system in which all workers participate"). For an argument opposing a unified tax-transfer
system, see Alstott, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 564-590 (cited in note 14) (arguing that the tax transfer
program raises problems of inaccuracy, unresponsiveness, and noncompliance).
118. Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 Geo. L.
J. 1499, 1538 (1991) (noting that Congress has structured the welfare system on the assumption
of substantial fraud).
119. Of course, even tax-based programs raise issues of fraud. See George K. Yin, The
Uncertain Fate of the Earned Income Tax, in Mary Louise Fellows and Karen B. Brown, eds.,
Taxing America 307-08 (New York U., 1996) (noting that countless theorists and policymakers
have worried that taxpayers fraudulently claim they are entitled to the EITC). Yin's work,
however, might simply indicate that programs intended for the poor are likely to be criticized
regardless of whether they are found in the Tax Code or elsewhere in federal laws.
120. This assumption is reflected in the work of Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan,
who argue that the tax laws should be written in a manner that actually enables wealthy
individuals to avoid transferring hard-earned money to the government. Geoffrey Brennan and
James M. Buchanan, The Power to Tar' Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution 199
(Cambridge U., 1980) (arguing that tax reform should create loopholes for taxpayers to avoid
rate increases and other "undue fiscal exploitation").
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Traditional tax theorists' assumption that for tax purposes the
poor have only a negative right to noninterference by the state is
problematic, therefore, in two ways. First, theorists appear not to be
taking a position on any positive rights the poor may hold when, in
fact, their analysis seriously circumscribes these rights. Second, by
explicitly addressing only the rights and obligations of the wealthy,
tax theorists have contributed to the inaccurate perception that the
poor are particularly prone to cheat society by demanding more than
the amount to which they are entitled. A more explicit discussion of
poor individuals' rights would avoid these unintended consequences
and at the same time subject controversial aims and goals to greater
public debate.
B. Assuming the Problem Already Is Solved
In this subpart, I explore the possibility that tax theorists have
viewed the series of exemptions, deductions, and credits as adequate
for protecting the positive rights of the poor. Many of these provisions
subsidize basic everyday needs including childcare, healthcare, and
housing. I argue that while these provisions clearly subsidize basic
needs, they fall short of of ensuring income security.
1. A Brief Description of the Provisions Subsidizing Basic Needs
In seeking to promote social and economic well-being and to
assure access to basic human necessities, Congress has adopted a
number of provisions that allow the taxpayer to deduct costs related
to items such as healthcare, childcare, and home ownership.
Additionally, the legislature has implemented provisions unrelated to
these targeted expenses but to subsidize general living expenses. The
provisions have various limitations and qualifications.
The most significant provision that subsidizes basic human
needs is the earned income tax credit under section 32 of the Code
(the EITC). Pursuant to section 32, Congress permits low-income
individuals working in the waged labor force to take a refundable tax
credit. A family earning between $8,425 and $11,000 with two or
more children, for example, is entitled to offset its tax burden by a
credit up to $3,370.11 If its value exceeds the actual tax imposed on

the individual's earnings, the credit works as a cash transfer program
121. I.R.C. § 32 (a), (b). $8,425 x .40 = $3,370.
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entitling the taxpayer to the amount of the credit in excess of the tax.
Congress intended the EITC to provide these economic benefits only
to individuals who work in the waged labor force and who live at
extremely low levels of income. If the taxpayer withdraws from the
market economy, the EITC will provide no benefits; and if the
individual's income exceeds $11,000, the EITC program will
drastically reduce the level of benefits available until they are fully
phased out. 122
Congress has adopted various other general provisions relating
to basic human needs. The standard deduction under section 63
permits a single taxpayer without children to deduct $4,000 if she
does not itemize her expenses. 123 Under section 151 of the Code, a
taxpayer is entitled to a $2,000 exemption for each parent and dependent in the household. 24 In an effort to ensure economic stability
in old age, Congress also allows the taxpayer to defer taxation of
income by depositing it into a qualified retirement account. The pension system is largely an employment-based savings program that
entitles the employee to defer taxation on her salary if it is held until
retirement.12 5 Congress, however, permits individuals seeking security in old age but left uncovered by employer pensions plans, to defer
taxation on up to $2,000 if contributed to a qualified individual retirement account.126

122. Id. Congress decreases the credit by 21 cents per dollar until it is fully phased out at
$27,000 because ($8,425 x .40) - [.2106 x ($27,000 - $11,000)] = 0. For a family with just one
qualifying child, the credit is phased out at rate of 16 cents per dollar until it is fully phased out
at $23,760 because (.34 x $6,000) - [.1598 x (23,760 - $11,000)] = 0. Id.
123. The amount of the standard deduction, however, changes according to an individuars
family characteristics. See I.R.C. § 63 (c) (2) (West 1996 ed.) (outlining amounts deductible for
married couples filing jointly, married individuals filing separate returns, and heads-of-household and surviving spouses).
124. This amount increases, however, to reflect increases in the consumer price index.
I.R.C. § 151(a).
125. Congress has imposed contribution limitations on the various forms of pensions funds.
A "defined contribution plan," for example, limits the taxpayer to contributing $30,000 of her
salary to the tax-exempt fund; and the employee is not permitted to receive more that $90,000
per year under a "defined benefit plan." I.R.C. §§ 415(c)(1) (annual contributions and additions
to a defined contribution plan may not exceed the lesser of $30,000 or 25% of the participant's
compensation); I.R.C. § 415(b)(1) (annual benefits under a defined benefits plan may not exceed
the lesser of $90,000 or 100% of the participants average compensation of his three highestpaying years). For a more extensive highest-paying discussion of the congressionally imposed
limitations on these plans and others, see John H. Langbein and Bruce A. Wolk, Pension and
Employee Benefit Law 262-73 (Foundation, 1995).
126. See Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law at 55 (cited in note 125),
for an elaboration on the characteristics of the IRA. For a brief discussion on these programs as
well as recent proposals for further tax incentives to savings, see also Regina T. Jefferson, The
American Dream Savings Account. Is It a Dream or a Nightmare?,in Mary Louise Fellows and
Karen B. Brown, eds., Taxing America 253-76 (New York U., 1996).

PROGRESSIVITY DEBATE

1997]

967

While the economic benefits awarded under the EITC, the
standard deduction, the personal exemption, and the retirement
provisions may be used for any expense incurred by the taxpayer,
Congress has also targeted specific expenses for preferential tax
treatment. The targeted provisions award exclusions, deductions, and
credits for items associated with gains on home ownership, 127
healthcare,12 8education,129 and childcare.1 30 If the taxpayer forgoes the
$4,000 standard deduction, she also may deduct additional health
care expenses that exceed 7.5% of her adjusted gross income, 31 and

the interest component of a home mortgage. 13 2
This brief description is intended simply to highlight the
provisions in the Code that arguably reflect Congress's concern for an
individual's access to basic human necessities. In the next two
sections, I argue these provisions not only fail to satisfy the poor's
positive claim to economic security, but in most cases they work to the
far greater benefit of the wealthy.
2. General and Targeted Tax Provisions
The provisions Congress adopted to secure basic subsistence
for poor individuals are all very similar in purpose and effect, with the
exception of the EITC. For purposes of discussion, therefore, I will
first address the provisions that are analytically similar. I then turn
to the EITC and explore its relationship to economic security in the
next Part.
As outlined above, each of these provisions, in effect, operate to
decrease an individual's federal tax burden, thereby leaving a greater
level of resources for individual consumption. While each of the
provisions reduce the tax costs associated with income, they do

127. With regard to home ownership, individuals who have attained age fifty-five may
exclude the gain from the sale of a primary residence. I.R.C. § 121.
128. In the realm of health care, Congress permits the taxpayer to deduct compensation
received for injury or sickness as well as contributions to health plans. I.R.C. §§ 104, 105, 106.
129. As to the cost of education, the legislature has exempted or deducted scholarships used
for tuition and related educational expenses, the costs of certain educational assistance
programs, and the income from savings bonds used to pay for higher education. I.R.C. §§ 117,
127, 135.
130. Congress permits the taxpayer to take a nonrefundable tax credit calculated as a
percentage of expenses up to $4,800 a year or a tax deduction of $5,000 per year. I.R.C. § 21(c)
(saving the taxpayer, at the most, $1,440 per year in taxes); § 129 (a)(2) (saving the taxpayer, at
the most, $1,980 in taxes).
131. I.R.C. § 213(a).

132. I.R.C. § 163(h).
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nothing for those who have no access to income. In short, without
gross income to offset or a tax burden to credit, the various deducOf
tions, exemptions, and credits offer no economic assistance.
generalthe
making
course, poor individuals have little gross income,
needs provisions largely superfluous from their perspective.
The marginal effect of these provisions can easily be demonstrated by examining the financial circumstances of those who live at
poverty levels. The poverty line designated by the U.S. Census
Bureau varies according to family size and composition. In 1995, the
federal government considered a married couple with one child and
income equal to or over $12,590 to be outside the boundaries of poverty.13 3 Accordingly, this Article explores the benefits that Congress
provides to a family earning $12,590.
The federal income tax rate applicable to a three person family
earning this amount is subject to a marginal tax rate of 15%. Thus,
the family would owe $1,888.50 in federal income taxes without the
taking into consideration the preferential treatment for basic needs
(that is, the provisions outlined above). The standard deduction and
the personal exemptions permitted under sections 63 and 151,
however, allow this hypothetical household to protect up to $11,000 in
gross income from federal taxation.134 Without even considering the
childcare, health care, or other basic needs provisions, therefore, the
standard deduction and personal exemptions operate to alleviate
$1,650 in taxes, leaving a tax burden of $238.50. If the family incurs
childcare expenses, it is likely the family's entire tax burden will then
be offset completely by the credit available under section 21 of the
Code.13 5 It is important to understand, however, that the most this
family can possibly save under the basic needs provisions is their
income tax burden of $1,888.50. These provisions award nothing
more than the negative right to be free from taxation.
While the basic needs provisions potentially exempt the poor
from paying income taxes, they offer no protection from federal
employment taxes. Under sections 3101 and 3111, employees must
pay social security, medicare, and unemployment taxes (collectively
known as "FICA taxes") at a rate of 7.65%. Thus while the income tax

133. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Secretary, Annual
Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines,60 Fed. Reg. 7,772 (Feb. 9, 1995).
134. I.R.C. § 63(c) ($5,000 standard deduction for a couple filing a joint return); I.R.C. §151
($2,000 exemption for taxpayer, spouse, and child). The allowable deductions are increased,
however, to reflect increases in the consumer price index.
135. I.R.C. § 21 permits the taxpayer to take a credit equal to 29% of up to $2,400 in childcare expenses. Because .29 x $2,400 = $696, the tax burden will be reduced to $0.

19971

PROGRESSVITY DEBATE

969

is imposed only on income exceeding the standard deduction, personal
exemptions, and the numerous other more targeted provisions, the
employment tax applies to each dollar earned irrespective of these
provisions. Thus a family of three with a single market participant
earning $12,590 will owe $963 in employment taxes, 136 but will be
exempt from paying the $1,888.50 in income taxes due to the personal
deduction and exemptions. Accordingly, the family's after-tax income
will equal $11,627. Admittedly, every dollar is extremely valuable to
individuals living at this low level of income. 137 At the same time, it
can hardly be argued that this minimal amount ensures meaningful
economic security for a family of three with everyday expenses that
include items such as food, rent, clothing, transportation, health care,
and potential emergencies.
Indeed, tax theorists have argued the basic needs provisions
not only fail to assist the poor in any meaningful manner, 38 but in
some circumstances operate to exacerbate economic difficulties.
Joseph Bankman, for example, has argued that many low-income
individuals are less interested in long-term economic security due to
their impending need for everyday necessities.
The pension
provisions (like the other provisions), therefore, are entirely useless to
poor individuals. 39 Bankman points out that Congress not only
adopted retirement subsidies that benefit savers (mostly high-income
individuals), but it further compounded the biases in the pension area
by adopting the anti-discrimination rules that work to ensure
employers include low-income wage earners in the corporate pension
plan. 140 The anti-discrimination rules, in effect, force the employer to

136.
137.
(arguing
138.

$12,590 x .0765 = $963.13.
See, for example, Blum and Kalven, The Uneasy Case at 56-57 (cited in note 7)
that the poor get greater utility from each dollar than do the wealthy).
Staudt, 84 Geo. L. J. at 1599-1605 (cited in note 24) (explaining why the childcare

credit offers very little assistance to low-income families); McCaffery, 40 UCLA L. Rev. at 101718 (cited in note 66) (same).
139. See, for example, Joseph Bankman, The Effect of Anti-DiscriminationProvisions on
Rank-and-File Compensation, 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 597, 603-05 (1994) (arguing that pension plan
provisions operate to deny low-income individuals' access to everyday necessities because
employers reduce immediate wages in order to deposit the sums into long-term savings plans);
Alstott, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 546-64 (cited in note 14) (outlining the manner in which the EITC
program discourages work and marriage among the recipients). For further criticisms of the
basic needs provisions, see Staudt, 84 Geo. L. J. at 1599-605 (cited in note 24) (arguing that the

childcare and elder care deductions and credits are virtually worthless to the poor); McCaffery,
40 UCLA L. Rev. at 1017-18 (cited in note 66) (demonstrating the limited economic impact of the

provisions on women at all income levels).
140. I.R.C § 401(a)(5) (West 1996 ed.) (requiring the ratio of retirement benefits to total
compensation be as great for rank-and-file employees as for highly compensated employees).
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divert low-income employees' salaries into the pension funds,
potentially denying the poor money that is needed to purchase
everyday necessities. Although analysts might respond that the antidiscrimination rules are justified on paternalistic grounds for
precisely this reason, Bankman argues the rules pose further
problems for rank-and-file employees. He notes that because lowincome wage earners value an immediate cash payment more than
they value money deposited into an inaccessible pension fund, the cost
of including the low-income wage earners into the corporate pension
plan might correspondingly increase the cost of employing these
individuals. The additional costs (that is, the difference between
immediate wages and long-term retirement benefits), in turn, are
likely to reduce the demand for rank-and-file employees and
ultimately reduce the perceived compensation of the employees left in
the industry.14 ' Congress's strategy of promoting individual economic
security in the long-run, therefore, might produce economic insecurity
in the short term for low-income wage earners.
Although the tax exemptions, deductions, and credits offer
little or nothing to poor individuals, they provide extremely lucrative
benefits to wealthy individuals. As the taxpayer's income increases,
therefore, the general and targeted provisions become more
valuable. 4 2 This characteristic can easily be illustrated. Imagine, for
example, a single hypothetical taxpayer, Ellen. Ellen earns $24,000 a
year, she is subject to a fifteen percent marginal tax rate, and thus
Ellen's financial circumstances change
pays $2,617.50 in taxes. 4
when she takes out a $50,000 mortgage at ten percent interest to
purchase a home. She pays approximately $5,000 of interest each

For further elaboration of the anti-discrimination provisions, see Bankman, 72 Wash. U. L. Q.
at 599-600 (cited in note 139); Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are
PensionPlan Anti-DiscriminationProvisionsDesirable?,55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 790 (1988).
141. Bankman, 72 Wash. U. L. Q. at 605-10 (cited in note 139). Bankman, however, also
points out that in one set of circumstances the anti-discrimination provisions will lead to an
increased demand and thus increased compensation for rank-and-file employees in an industry.
In all other contexts, provisions will reduce the perceived compensation and welfare of the lowincome wage earners. See id. at 609, 612-13.
142. As Bankman highlights, in the pension context, highly compensated employees often
value long-term pension benefits more than immediate cash transfers. Because the employer is
able to deposit moneys into the corporate pension plan for the benefit of these individuals, often
at a rate lower than the individual's salary, the costs of employing highly compensated individuals decrease. These decreased costs might, in turn, increase demand and ultimately the
perceived wages of this group. Bankman, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. at 606 (cited in note 139).
143. Ellen's income is reduced by $6,550-the amount of the personal exemption and
standard deduction. Thus 15% tax on $17,450.00 equals $2,617.50. Ellen can take no targeted
deductions, and she is not entitled to the EITC under section 32 of the Internal Revenue Code
because she is single with no children. See I.R.C. § 32.
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year to her lender, and as discussed above, Ellen is entitled to deduct
her interest payments under section 163(h) of the Code. Accordingly,
Ellen's tax burden decreases from $2,617.50 to $2,467.50-a tax
savings of $150.00.14
Now consider a second hypothetical taxpayer, Deborah, who is
also single and has also borrowed $50,000 from a bank at ten percent
interest to purchase a home. The single economic difference between
Ellen and Deborah is Deborah's salary, which is $55,000 per year and
the corresponding marginal tax rate which is thirty-one percent.
Taking into consideration the interest deduction under section 163(h),
Deborah will owe $10,869.50 in taxes; without the mortgage interest
deduction she would owe $11,179.50. Due to Deborah's higher
marginal rate, she saves $310 as compared to Ellen's tax saving of
$150.145

Although these hypothetical taxpayers demonstrate the
upside-down nature of the deduction to taxpayers with divergent
income tax rates, the discrepancies are often far more extreme than
these simple examples indicate. Deborah, earning more than twice as
much as Ellen, will most likely purchase a larger, more expensive
home with a correspondingly bigger mortgage and greater interest
payments. Accordingly, the tax preference found in section 163(h)
will become even more valuable to a taxpayer in Deborah's position.
That the mortgage interest deduction is limited to loans up to one
million dollars demonstrates the potential for the provision to benefit
the wealthy to a far greater extent than the poor. 148

144. Section 163(h)(3) allows Ellen to take the mortgage interest deduction only if she
foregoes the standard deduction. Because the standard deduction for a taxpayer in Ellen's
position is equal to $4,000 and the interest payments are $5,000, Ellen will, of course, choose to
deduct the latter. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3).
145. The analysis would be the same in the context of an exemption from taxation but not
with the provisions allowing a tax credit-although the value of the credit still generally
increases as the taxpayer's marginal tax rates increase as the following example indicates. In
the typical tax credit context (that is, when the tax credit is nonrefundable), Congress permits
the taxpayer to offset her actual tax burden with a specified amount. With regard to childcare,
for example, Congress permits a taxpayer with two children to offset her tax burden with a
credit of up to 30% of $4,500.00 or $1,350, I.R.C. § 21. If the taxpayer's tax does not equal the
amount of the credit, the remaining portion is simply lost to the taxpayer. For a further
discussion of these and related issues, see Staudt, 84 Geo. L. J. at 1643-47 (cited in note 24).
146. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(c). Section 68, however, reduces the percentage a taxpayer can claim
for certain itemized deductions after adjusted gross income exceeds $108,000. Thus, it is those
taxpayers in the highest tax bracket, but below the phaseout who gain the greatest benefit-not
those who are the wealthiest of all taxpayers. Moreover, if one views the deductions and
exemptions as appropriate for reaching a definition of taxable income, the current system is not
an upside-down subsidy for the rich.
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Additionally, the example discusses two hypothetical taxpayers
who are both able to afford the cost of a home. Countless low-income
individuals do not have the credit history necessary to borrow funds
from a commercial bank. 147 Rather than buying a home, these individuals will rent living space and thus garner no special privileges
under section 163(h) of the Code. The mortgage interest deduction,
therefore, affords the greatest benefits to the wealthiest taxpayers
and literally no economic advantage to the poorest individuals.
Although this analysis considers the mortgage interest deduction
under section 163(h), a close examination of every preferential provision outlined above, with the exception of the EITC, will yield identical results.14 Paradoxically, then, the basic needs provisions offer
little or no assistance to the extremely poor and become far more
lucrative as one's income increases.
3. The Earned Income Tax Credit
The EITC must be calculated in order to understand the full
tax consequences to the hypothetical family earning $12,590 of pretax income. While the provisions outlined in the last subpart offer
147. For a discussion of the explicitly racist red-lining procedures followed by several
federal loan programs working to deny low-income individuals loans, see John A. Powell, How
Government Tax and Housing Policies Have Racially Segregated America, in Mary Louise
Fellows and Karen B. Brown, eds., Taxing America 80-115 (New York U., 1996).
148. Many individuals, for example, cannot afford health care or childcare and cannot
afford to deposit moneys into tax-deductible retirement funds. These citizens, therefore, do not
receive the economic benefits of the provisions outlined above. See, for example, Stephanie
Golden, The Women Outside (U. of Chicago, 1992) (detailing the lives of homeless women and
the financial difficulties associated with "real life outside"). For further discussion of the upsidedown nature of the tax preferences, see Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, Tax
Expenditures 71-82 (Harvard U., 1985).
Even considering the impact of the EITC,the tax burden historically has increased for the
poor, while Congress has lowered the effective marginal tax rates for the wealthy through the
preferential treatment given to these expenses and countless others. The following chart
reflects the Congressional Budget Office estimates of the changes in income tax burdens that
have occurred for individuals at different levels of income:
Estimate of Percent Change in Tax Liabilities from 1977-1990.
Income Quintile
lowest
second
third
fourth
highest
top 10%
top 5 %
top 1%
Congressional Budget Office 1990, table 9.

Percent change
0.6
7.1
8.4
8.0
-23.8
-30.8
-36.2
-39.0
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little or nothing to the poor, the EITC is far more successful at
satisfying a positive right to income. The EITC, found in section 32 of
the Code, entitles a low-income wage earner to a refundable tax credit
based on income level and number of children in the household. For
example, the program entitles a family with income equal to $6,000
and one child, to a subsidy of thirty-four cents on every dollar
earned. 149 Once the taxpayer's income exceeds $11,000, however, the
credit begins to decrease until it is completely phased out when the
taxpayer's salary reaches $23,760. Thus, a married couple with one
child earning $12,590 is entitled to an earned income credit of
$1,786.1 0 Importantly, Congress did not adopt the credit to lift all
individuals out of poverty, but rather to provide minimal financial
assistance to the extremely needy who work in the waged labor force.
Based on the calculations above (including those in the last
section), the hypothetical family will not owe any income tax, will be
subject to $963 in employment taxes, and will receive a $1,786 cash
transfer under the EITC. Thus, after taking into consideration all
potential burdens and benefits found within the Code, this family will
receive $823 from the federal government on top of the $12,590 salary
earned in the private market-totaling $13,413. Although countless
theorists have debated the level of income necessary to ensure basic
human needs and the concept of poverty in general, 5' the claim that a
payment from the government of $823 ensures basic economic
security for a family of three living on the edge of poverty would be
disingenuous.
Moreover, Congress has not tied the EITC cash transfer only to
the level of an individual's poverty, but conditions the transfer on the
taxpayer's market participation. If the taxpayer fails to participate in
the market economy, the credit is unavailable irrespective of economic
need. In this respect, the EITC fails to account for the difficulties

149. I.R.C. § 32(b).
150. (.34 x $6,000) - [.1598 x ($12,590 - $11,000)] = $1,786. See I.R.C. § 32(b). For a detailed description of the EITC, see Alstott, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 541 & n.38, 542-43 (cited in note
14) (providing useful graphs and discussing the operation of the provision for a low-income
family with two children). See also Timothy J. Eifler, Comment, The Earned Income Tax Credit
As a Tax Expenditure. An Alternative To TraditionalWelfare Reform, 28 U. Rich. L. Rev. 701,
713-15, 750-55 (1994) (discussing tax credit for families of various sizes and income levels); Yin,
The Uncertain Fate, in Fellow and Brown, eds., Taxing America at 297 (cited in note 119)
(discussing the limitation of the EITC program and proposing an alternative solution for ensuring low-income individuals have access to basic needs and resources).
151. Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation 9-38
(Clarendon, 1981) (discussing various conceptions of poverty).
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that an individual might have in entering and maintaining a position
in the formal market economy. Many individuals, for example, are
unable to enter the private market due to childcare or elder care
responsibilities.
Academic studies have repeatedly demonstrated the manner in
which the tax structure itself discourages the market participation of
individuals with these household responsibilities. Consider the
financial circumstances of women with children. The Tax Code does
not impose a tax on the value of women's household services but does
impose employment and income taxes on the benefits of waged labor
in the market."' Additionally, women working in the market, like
workers generally, will be forced to incur costs for items such as
business attire and transportation-all nondeductible personal
expenses. Although Congress allows working women to deduct a
portion of the cost of childcare under section 21 of the Code, the
savings obtained under section 21 is far below the actual cost of
childcare. 153 Indeed, due to the tax and other costs associated with
market labor, women often lose money by working in the market and
4
thus rationally choose to stay home and care for their own children.5
That decision, however, will bar them from obtaining the benefits
under the EITC even if they live deep in poverty.
Additionally, the federal government has frequently adopted
policies that maintain a certain level of unemployment. In order to
avoid the cost of accelerating inflation, economists have persuaded
policymakers that unemployment is not only necessary but key to
growth and productivity of the economy. 55 Accordingly, policymakers
152. See, for example, Staudt, 84 Geo. L. J. 1587 (cited in note 24) (discussing impact of the
Tax Code on women's work labor and considering the possibility of taxing housework);
McCaffery, 40 UCLA L. Rev. at 1059 (cited in note 66) (also discussing impact of Tax Code on
women's labor but using the optimal tax theory as an analytical framework for arguing
Congress should reduce the tax on married women). See also note 26 (discussing the optimal

tax theory).
153. A woman earning a $15,000 salary, for example, will have tax savings of just $15. See
McCaffery, 40 UCLA L. Rev. at 1014-29 (cited in note 66) (calculating the potential tax savings
of the childcare and other provisions for women at various levels of income). See also Mary
Heen, Welfare Reform, The Child CareDilemma, and the Tax Code, in Mary Louise Fellows and
Karen B. Brown, eds., Taxing America 322-23 (New York U., 1996) (calculating the benefits under the childcare provisions and noting their limited impact).
154. See Staudt, 84 Geo.L. J. at 1571 (cited in note 24).

155. Countless economic theorists have noted the costs of inflation, including its
distortionary effects on the distribution of income and wealth and its tendency to discourage
investment activities. See, for example, Rebecca M. Blank and Alan S. Blinder, Macroeconomic,
Income Distribution,and Poverty (U. of Wisconsin-Madison, IRP Conference Paper, Feb. 1985)

(discussing the impact of inflation on the poor and claiming it is "the cruelest ta'); Paul A.
Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics 314 (McGraw Hill, 1989) (noting the major

problems occur when inflation is volatile-unanticipated inflation redistributes wealth from
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have sought to maintain the "natural rate" of unemployment in an
effort to ward off problematic inflation.156 At the same time, however,
some economists have argued that the perceived natural rate of
unemployment is far above the voluntary level of unemployment. Put
differently, the state potentially keeps individuals who want jobs out
of the market in order to avoid the social and economic costs of
inflation.
Under current circumstances, therefore, unemployment is
inevitable and perhaps made even worse by legislative policies intended to promote growth and stability. Yet, the architects of the
EITC have mandated that poor individuals maintain employment in
the waged labor market if they hope to receive financial assistance
from the state. By tying basic human needs to wage labor and at the
same time pursuing policies that make it impossible for the poor to
creditors to debtors while unforeseen disinflation has the opposite effect); Robert Barro,
Inflation and Economic Growth, in National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 5326
(1995) (arguing that inflation inhibits growth); Irving S. Friedman, Inflation: A World-Wide
Disaster 205-53 (Houghton Mifflin, 1980) (discussing the problem of inflation in the world
economy). In seeking to deter inflationary pressure on the market, many economic theorists
have noted that there exists a tradeoff, at least in the short term, between inflation and
unemployment. Alice M. Rivlin, Reviewing the American Dream: The Economy, the States, and
the Federal Government 57 (Brookings Institute, 1992). Thus, stimulative fiscal policies reduce
unemployment but are likely to aggravate inflation, and restrictive measures will take the
pressure off inflation but will probably raise unemployment. In short, "control of inflation in a
modern industrial economy poses one of the cruelest dilemmas that must be faced by economy
policymakers." See Samuelson and Nordhaus, Economics at 329-36 (cited in this note) (arguing
that the natural rate of inflation might lie somewhere above the level necessary for frictional
migration and young and untested workers looking for jobs). See also Marc Bendick, Jr.,
Government's Role in the Job Transitions of U.S. Dislocated Workers, in F. Stevens Redburn,
Terry F. Buss, and Larry C.Ledebur, eds., Revitalizing the U.S. Economy 158, 159 (Praeger,
1986) (stating that "cyclical macroeconomic factors" (such as a recession), not structural factors
(such as technological change), push millions of workers out of the waged labor force). See also
Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and Macroeconomics, 45
Stan. L. Rev. 1215, 1227-46 (1993) (discussing and critiquing various theories of
unemployment).
156. The level of unemployment that economists and policymakers deem necessary for an
efficient operation of the economy is the "natural rate of unemployment:' or the
"nonaccelerating-inflation rate of unemployment." See Robert J. Gordon, Understanding
Inflation in the 1980s, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 263-302 (1985) (discussing the
rising level of the "natural level of unemployment"). See also Samuelson and Nordhaus,
Economics at 296-97 (cited in note 155) ("Responsible and farsighted policymakers, therefore,
generally do not intentionally aim the economy at ...unemployment rates below the natural
rates. To do so would lead to inflation."). While the natural rate of inflation might fluctuate, it
seems to be rising. See Herbert Stein, PresidentialEconomics: The Making of Economic Policy
from Roosevelt to Clinton 150-51 (American Enterprise Institute, 1994) (noting that in the 1960s
and 1970s most economists calculated the rate around 4% and by the 1980s it was calculated at
6-7%). See also James K Galbraeth, Time To Ditch the NAIRU, 11 J. Econ. Persp. 93-108
(1997) (arguing that the concept of the natural rate of unemployment is controversial and
largely useless and thus should be abandoned).
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obtain a position in the market, the state has established procedures
and policies that operate to deny the poor the very rights it has bestowed upon them.157 The ineffectiveness of the EITC, along with the
superfluous deductions and exemptions, therefore, indicate that tax
policy makers either are not pursuing a program that ensures the
poor have access to basic subsistence income or are completely ineffective in their pursuit.
C. Assuming the Problem Will Solve Itself
Tax and economic theorists have taken the position that
growth policies are the surest way to provide wealth and opportunity
for all individuals, both wealthy and poor.158 National growth and
economic stability, it is argued, will not only assist families and
individuals to purchase nutrition, medical care and other basic necessities, but it can also enable the state to provide education, health
care, and shelter for low-income and poverty-stricken individuals. 159
Thus while tax theorists have not explored the possibility of awarding
specific subsidies to the poor beyond an exemption, they have pursued
a strategy of growth that many believe is a more effective route to
economic security. In short, tax theorists might argue that they have
not ignored positive rights but have pursued them indirectly through
growth strategies.
Theorists consider the Tax Code an important instrument for
promoting market growth and productivity. One obvious example of
this use is the lower marginal tax rate Congress has imposed upon
gains earned through capital investments.

60

Decreased taxation

arguably provides an incentive for investment and savings, thereby
increasing overall growth. This provision is just one of countless
61
provisions intended to spur the growth of the market.

157. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Simplification for Low-Income Taxpayers, in Mary

Louise Fellows and Karen B. Brown, eds., Taxing America 279 (New York U., 1997) (noting that
all the benefits of the EITC go to families with adjusted gross income of $30,000 or less).
158. See discussion of the market growth and the trickle-down effect in note 73 and
accompanying text.
159. Sen, 268 Sci. Am. at 45 (cited in note 71). See Richard A. Easterlin, Does Economic
Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence, in Nations and Households, in
Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder, eds., Economic Growth. Essays in Honor of Moses
Abramovitz 89 (Academic, 1974).
160. Compare I.R.C. § 1(a) (West 1996 ed.) (imposing tax rate of 39.6% on ordinary income)
with I.R.C. § 1(h) (imposing tax rate of 28% on capital gains).
161. See, for example, Cathie Martin, Shifting the Burden: The Struggle Over Growth and
Corporate Taxation (U. of Chicago, 1991) (exploring Congress's historical focus on growth and
the mechanisms used to promote it).
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Unfortunately, economic growth is a policy that most nations
pursue, but that has never provided economic security or access to
basic material needs. Amartya Sen, for example, points to a number
of economies that have maintained a high level of GDP but have
inferior records on education, health, and general welfare as
compared to those with a lower GDP. Although the relationship
between a growing economy and the provision of basic human needs
has been extensively discussed and analyzed in the context of
developing nations, 162 it is also relevant to wealthy industrial nations.
Indeed, as Sen argues, "American public policy-makers may have
failed to understand important dimensions of social welfare because
of an overconcentration on aggregate wealth and overall economic
63
growth."
The disjointed relationship between aggregate economic
growth and poor individuals' access to basic human needs is clear in a
number of contexts. Consider the availability of health care. Many
policymakers and theorists have noted the relationship of health care
to basic human survival and have argued that the state has a role in
providing this basic need. Stephen Holmes argues, for example, that
virtually every major liberal and democratic theorist would argue that
it is incumbent upon our society to provide the resources necessary for
such care.'16 The Tax Code itself reflects the importance of adequate
health care through sections 102, 104, 106, and 213, all of which give
preferential treatment to costs associated with maintaining personal
health.
Despite this prevailing view on the importance of health care
and the extremely high level of gross domestic product in the United
States, countless American men and women have no access to health
care. This lack of care has had an observable and troubling impact on
the lives of many poor Americans living in poor urban communities.
Indeed, Amartya Sen has collected data indicating that black men

162. See, for example, H. W. Arndt, Economic Development: The History of an Idea 89-113
(U. of Chicago, 1987) (discussing the origins and issues of economic growth policies in developing countries and their success in to providing basic needs); Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Wealth and
Poverty: Essays in Development Economics (MIT, 1985) (outlining economic growth strategies
and the social and political issues they raise).
163. Sen, Sci. Am. at 45-46 (cited in note 71).
164. "How can constitutional principles originally designed to outlaw judicial torture and

religious persecution plausibly be invoked to forbid the provision of prenatal care to the impoverishedT' Holmes, Passions and Constraint at 37 (cited in note 109) (arguing modest redistributional measures are not even remotely similar to the tyrannical behavior that worried the
framers).
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living in east Harlem have a shorter expected life span than
165
individuals living in Bangladesh, China, and India.
The nature of the health care problem in the United States,
however, cannot be understood simply by measuring the GDP or even
the relative income levels between American individuals and those
living in developing countries. The U.S. GDP far exceeds the level of
the GDP in the Bangladesh, China, and India. Additionally, data
indicates that while the Americans with these high mortality rates
live in poverty according to American standards, they are much richer
and have much higher levels of purchasing power than the
Bangladeshi, Chinese, and Indian citizens. 166 A rising level of national economic growth and high individual income levels, therefore,
do not ensure access to the basic material needs necessary for social
and economic well-being.
Perhaps the data that most explicitly show that high levels of
aggregate economic growth do not necessarily ensure access to the
basic human needs are the government statistics relating to current
poverty levels. Although the number of individuals with income under the poverty line tends to rise during recessions and fall during
periods of economic growth, there is a definite upward trend in overall
poverty levels. 67 In 1993, fifteen percent of the U.S. population was
living in poverty.168 If the data is broken down according to personal
characteristics and family circumstances, the percentages drastically
increase. Thirty-three percent of African-American citizens live in
poverty; fifty-three percent of all families with a female head-ofhousehold live below the poverty level; and twenty-two percent of all
children live with poor families.169 Thus, while this country has
experienced economic growth over the last several decades, there has
been no correlative decrease in the level of poverty as the market
growth theorists have anticipated.170
The market growth approach to tax policymaking, therefore, is
as flawed as the approach that awards subsidies to taxpayers through
165. Sen, 268 Sci. Am. at 45-46 (cited in note 71).

166. Id.
167. U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 1995, 480 tbl. 744
(1995) (providing data on persons living below the poverty level between the years 1960 and
1993).
168. Id. at 480 table 744. See also Nancy Folbre, The New Field Guide to the U.S. Economy
1.1-4.18 (Pantheon, 1995) (providing various statistics and information that is useful for understanding the distribution of income and wealth based on class, gender, and race).
169. U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract at 480 tables 744 & 745, 483 table 750
(cited in note 167).
170. Blank and Blinder, Macroeconomic, Income Distribution, and Poverty at 4 (cited in
note 155).
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the provisions outlined in the preceding subpart. Neither approach
ensures that the poor will have access to basic income needs. Indeed,
the two approaches have advanced the interests of the wealthy to a
far greater extent than the interests of the poor. Accordingly,
traditional tax theorists cannot claim that the provisions and policies
accord the poor a positive right to income.
Of course, tax theorists are not responsible for the failings of
the tax system, but they can be held responsible for comprehending
the easily observable limitations of the tax policies grounded in the
very theories they advocate. By arguing the poor have a positive right
to wealth and market opportunity while pursuing policies that are
entirely ineffective, theorists and policymakers appear to have given
the poor something of value when in fact what is given amounts to
nothing.1 71 This approach not only imposes material costs upon the
poor, but it also imposes serious social and cultural costs. The illusion
that tax theorists and policymakers are genuinely protecting the
interests of the poor allows society to avoid resolving the difficult
question of whether poor citizens in fact do have positive rights and
entitlements.
Moreover, by creating the illusion that tax policy fully addresses the concerns of the poor, theorists and policymakers, in effect,
make any further claims on society unjustified. Indeed, it allows
society to view the poor as not only unproductive and lazy, but also as
hustlers trying to cheat the system when they make claims for income
and security beyond what is already provided. In short, society might
falsely perceive the poor as undeserving when in fact they might
17 2
deserve more than they have received.
IV. THE MISSING DEBATE OVER RESPONSIBILITIES
In this Part, I turn from rights to responsibilities. Although
traditional tax theorists appear to assume that the poor have at least
some minimal rights with regard to the state, no theorist has ever

171. See note 176.
172. This problem is similar but not identical to the problems associated with tax theorists'
complete failure to address the rights of the poor. In the preceding Part, I argued one unified
discussion of the rights and obligations of both the wealthy and the poor might avoid the false
perception that the rights of the poor consistently trump the rights of the wealthy. In this Part,
I argue that theorists and policymakers appear to have already considered and protected the
positive rights of the poor, when in fact they have not done so.
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considered the possibility that the poor might also have
responsibilities. While tax theorists' failure to investigate rights
imposes obvious and hidden costs upon the poor, the problems
associated with their failure to explore a poor individual's positive
obligation to the state is much more subtle. At first cut, it might
appear that in more thoroughly addressing individual rights we can
only advantage the poor while addressing responsibilities can only
produce further marginalization. When the effects of tax theorists'
failure to consider a poor individual's responsibility to the state are
analyzed closely, however, it becomes clear that this oversight has
seriously disadvantaged the poor. Accordingly, I argue that tax
theorists must recognize the possibility that all citizens, wealthy and
poor, are capable of contributing to the greater social good.
Early social contract theorists and utilitarian theorists explicitly addressed a relatively wealthy citizen's obligation and responsibility to the greater social good. 173 The contemporary debate on distribu-

tive justice, however, has focused on individual rights which, in turn,
has led traditional tax theorists to center their discussion on taxpayer
rights and entitlements before considering the individual's obligation
to the state. 74 Focusing primarily on rights in the taxation context is
particularly surprising in light of the fact that the laws raise obvious
and fundamental questions with regard to a citizen's responsibility to
the public good.
Countless theorists have lamented society's preoccupation with
rights, arguing that "it is the responsibilities of a citizen that... pro-

173. Theorists using Hobbes's political theory attempted to impose tax burdens commensurate with social benefits, assuming that one's responsibility to the social good was equal to the
benefits obtained. Under the utilitarian ethic, individuals have a moral responsibility to
support policies that promote overall welfare, even if they are not in one's own economic
interest. Thus, a utilitarian tax regime calls for the wealthy to pay a higher percentage of their
wealth to the common good because poor individuals get infinite utility from each dollar
whereas lower levels of utility inure to the the wealthy. See Part II.B.2.
174. See, for example, Carens, 14 Pol. Theory 31 (cited in note 92) (arguing that
contemporary liberal political theories focus on rights and not responsibilities). But see Kent
Greenawalt, Promise, Benefit, and Need: Ties that Bind Us to the Law, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 727, 733
(1984) (arguing that traditional debates imply that individual citizens have duties under the
social contract). See notes 110-16 and accompanying text (discussing Hohfeld's terminology and
the link between rights and duties). With regard to economic theorists' failure to perceive
responsibility as relevant to policymaking, see Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom at 133 (cited
in note 73) C'[Flew trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free
society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as
much money for their stockholders as possible."); Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism,
62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 130, 151 (1995) ('[B]ecause the stockholders have a right to their earnings
and the community at large has no right to be free of whatever unethical practices are being
challenged, these economists conclude that the answer is clear cut: the presence or absence of
rights pretermits any discussion of responsibility.").

1997]

PROGRESSIMTY DEBATE

981

vide[] a bridge between selfish, rights-bearing individuals and
their... community." 175
Rights talk, it is argued, "promotes
unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits
dialogue that might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at
least the discovery of common ground." 176 Moreover, many political
and moral theorists have forcefully argued that the very notion of
citizenship is intimately linked with both individual entitlement and
obligation to a community. 7 7 The political theorist T.H. Marshall, for
example, contended that by guaranteeing civil, political, and social
rights to all, the state ensures that every member is able to
participate in and enjoy the common life of society.1 78 Withholding
these rights ultimately marginalizes individuals in the community.
At the same time, theorists have argued that the inability to fulfill
community obligations or to maintain some level of civic virtue is as
much of an obstacle to full membership in society as is the lack of

175. Sherry, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 132 (cited in note 174).

176. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of PoliticalDiscourse 14 (Free
Press, 1991) ("[nIn its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone acceptance of the
benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state, without accepting the corresponding
personal and civic obligations."). The power of Glendon's point is particularly relevant in the
tax context. Consider the tax revolt in California during the 1970s, which resulted in the
adoption of Proposition 13-a law that operated to dramatically reduce state property taxes. As
a result of the tax reduction, Californians suffered major cutbacks in education funding, social
welfare programs, and many other programs. Indeed, the tax reduction ultimately worked to
the greater benefit of commercial taxpayers and to the burden of the poorest individuals. See
Susan B. Hansen, The Politics of Taxation.' Revenue Without Representation212-46 (Praeger,
1983) (describing Proposition 13 and its consequences). At the time Proposition 13 was enacted,
citizens argued the California tax laws violated their right to income but they never considerd
what level of obligation they had or should have to the state. See id.
Suzanna Sherry highlights the problems associated with "rights tall' by pointing to two
hypothetical discussions with two hypothetical individuals. In the first discussion, one individual argues she has the right to a childcare subsidy and the other contends that she has the right
not to be burdened with the higher taxes necessary to support the the childcare. Now imagine
the same question examined in the context of whether it would be good for society as a whole to
ensure that all citizens have access to economic security. One leads to compromise while the
other is a zero-sum game. Sherry, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 147 (cited in note 174) (citing the work
of Ronald Beiner).
Professor Sherry argues that in letting rights overwhelm responsibilities, society seems to
give something of value when often what is given amounts to nothing. Consider, for example,
the idea that women have a right to work. This right is meaningless if family obligations and
the workaholic tendencies of their male colleagues prevent women from being assimilated into
the workforce. Suzanna Sherry, Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty,", 78 Minn. L. Rev 61,
73 (1993) (also noting that a "poor pregnant woman has a 'right' to an abortion, but no resources
with which to turn her life around whether or not she choses to have the child" and school
children have a right to integrated education, but not an adequate one).
177. Kymlicka and Norman, 104 Ethics at 353 (cited in note 51) (describing the work of
several theorists who have made the link between social obligation and meaningful citizenship).
178. T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenshipand Social Development Essays (Doubleday, 1965).

982

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:919

equal rights.179 Accordingly, I seek to refocus tax theorists on the
importance of individual fulfillment of social obligation and at the
same time expand the discussion to include both the wealthy and the
poor.
It is obvious that by contributing money to the fisc, taxpayers
fulfill an obligation to the community. Paying taxes, however, does
not only impose a burden. Taxpayers share in the benefits of an organized society as well as the provision of public goods and services
that could not be obtained in the private market.180
Moreover, by paying taxes, the relatively wealthy seem to
attain a privileged status in contemporary political and legal debates.
The idea that an individual's social standing improves upon the
payment of taxes is likely to be met with suspicion, perhaps even
laughter, by contemporary tax theorists. 18' Understanding the social
value of paying taxes, however, is key to understanding fully why
traditional tax theory has contributed to the marginalization of the
poor.
First, consider the fact that tax policy debates have generally
privileged the interests of the relatively wealthy. In the 1996
presidential election, both candidates focused on tax issues that could
only be of importance to middle and upper class individuals. Bill
Clinton and Bob Dole, for example, both proposed tax reform that
would enable individuals to set aside a greater percentage of income
in tax-free retirement funds. 82 Dole also advocated a decrease in the
179. Sherry, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 148 (cited in note 174) (asserting that citizenship is "so
intertwined with responsibility"); Carens, 14 Pol. Theory at 31-49 (cited in note 92) (arguing
that all individuals have the moral duty to contribute their talents and energies to society to the
greatest extent possible); Mead, Beyond Entitlement at 12-13 (cited in note 14) (stating that
programs that afford rights but fail to impose responsibilities infringe upon equality because
responsibilities are "just as necessary for belonging"); Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L. Q. 8, 26 (1928) (arguing that property rights carry with them the
positive duty to use the property in the public interst and for the benefit of one's community).
180. Weston, Principles of Justice at 128 (cited in note 41) (noting that the benefits from
the state include "glory, honor, education, religion, national well-being, etc.").
181. The idea that one has an obligation to society and that fullfilling that responsibility
improves one's social standing in not, however, foreign to theorists in all disciplines. See, for
example, Carens, 14 Pol. Theory at 33-34 (cited in note 92) (arguing that all individuals have
the responsibility to give their talents and energies to society and that a person who satisfies
this obligation contributes to an egalitarian society and deserves moral praise); Mead, Beyond
Entitlement (cited in note 14) (satisfying the social obligation to work enables one to participate
in society in a more meaningful way); Seligman, ProgressiveTaxation at 184-85 (cited in note 2)
(quoting, admittedly, Robespierre as arguing that the "result of any exemption for such an
honorable obligation to be taxed would necessarily result in the restriction of democracy").
182. See The President'sEconomic Plan: TargetingTax Relief to Middle-IncomeAmericans
(proposing to expand the limitations on retirement fund contributions imposed on couples with
incomes up to $80,000); Restoring the American Dream: Bob Dole's Pro-Growth Plan for
America's Families (proposing similar expansion on limitations imposed on IRA contributions).
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marginal tax rates in general and the capital gains rates in
18
particular. s
Perhaps more disturbing than devising tax legislation tailored
to the interests of the relatively wealthy is the fact that society itself
accords more respect to taxpayers than nontaxpayers in the public
debates. The discourse related to the distribution of welfare benefits
easily demonstrates this point. This dialogue views taxpayers as
hard-working and disciplined individuals who unfortunately must
provide economic assistance to the deviant and lazy welfare
recipients. Not only does the welfare rhetoric paint relatively wealthy
taxpayers as humanitarians who must save the poor from themselves,
but welfare legislation also often more explicitly addresses the interests of taxpayers than the needs of the poor.18 4
In advocating an exclusion from the tax laws and from all
other social obligations, traditional tax theory, therefore, has worked
to marginalize the poor in both the social policymaking process and in
society-at-large. This exclusion and marginalization, in turn, works
to curb the poor's interest and commitment to broader social and
political issues. 185 Rather than participating in the political process
by expressing their own ideas and viewpoints, the poor often remain

See Adam Clymer, Poor Losers: Class Warfare? The Rich Win By Default, N.Y. Times, § 4 at 1
(Aug. 11, 1996) (arguing that both candidates have created a platform tailored to the interests of
middle and upper income individuals). Of course, the idea that the political process panders to
the interests of powerful players is widely understood. See, for example, Brennan and
Buchanan, The Power to Tax at 13 (cited in note 120) (describing the economic approach to the
political process and arguing it is nothing more than an "institutional setting within which
persons and groups interact to pursue their own end); Jamin Raskin and John Bonitaz, Equal
Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 Yale Law & Pol'y Rev. 273 (1993) (arguing that private
money controls both policies and government);
183. See Bob Dole's Tax Proposal, Restoring the American Dream.
184. See Note, Dethroningthe Welfare Queen. The Rhetoric of Reform, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
2113 (1995) (the welfare debate has been "reduced to a clash of moral symbols"); Richard Pildes,
The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 936, 952 (1991)
(arguing that the laws are set up to permit individuals simply to pay for welfare assistance but
not to change underlying problems associated with poverty and isolation).
185. Feminist scholars have argued that the laws excluding women also work to marginalize women in a number of ways. The federal governments decision to exclude women from
certain military positions, for example, prevents women from sharing in valuable patriotic and
political responsibilities. This, in turn, promotes indifference to matters of security, defense,
war, and peace. See Robin Rogers, A Proposal for Combating Sexual Discrimination in the
Military: Amendment of Title VII, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 165, 168 (1990); Judith Hicks Stiehm, The
Effects of Myths about Military Women on the Waging of War, in Eva Isaksson, ed., Women and
the Military System 104 (St. Martin's, 988). Compare Lucinda Finley, Breaking Women's Silence
in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 886
(1989) (noting that women's historical exclusion from the law has produced gendered legal
language that works to subordinate and marginalize women).
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outside public debate even in circumstances under which they could
easily make their views more widely known. The demographic
characteristics of those who vote reflect the political apathy of poor
individuals. Only eight percent of voters come from families with
income under $15,000,186 though these same families represent
twenty-three percent of the population.187 Conversely, families with
income above $15,000 make up seventy-eight percent of the
population but represent ninety-two percent of the voters.
Commentators have argued that this political indifference is directly
linked to the manner in which social policy, and tax policy in
particular, tends to address the interests of the relatively wealthy
rather than the concerns of the those living in poverty.188
Of course traditional tax theorists may not have entirely neglected the poor, but may have intended to impose negative rather
than positive responsibilities (that is, self-restraint versus positive
activities). Indeed, just as many other public policy areas rely on selfrestraint, 189 successful tax policy also relies upon the poor to meet
their negative responsibility to society. If poor individuals avoid
demanding excessive benefits under the Code, for example, they will
avoid imposing inefficient costs upon society and infringing upon the
property rights of the relatively wealthy. That traditional tax
theorists have raised these concerns for over a century implies that
they have sought to impose just this type of negative responsibility
upon the poor. While all citizens have certain negative obligations to
society, the notion that the poor must privilege the rights and
interests of the relatively wealthy is precisely the notion that has led
to the deep bias against the poor in taxation debates as well as their
cultural marginalization and political apathy. It leaves the poor in
the disadvantaged position of patiently and quietly waiting for the
wealthy to decide their social and economic fate. To ensure the poor

186. Clymer, N.Y. Times § 4 at 1 (cited in note 182) (noting that politicians have no fear of
poor voters in light of their history of not voting and arguing that this pattern has produced

class-biased legislation).
187. U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 1996 (1996).
188. See, for example, Clymer, N.Y. Times § 4 at 1 (cited in note 182).
189. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman note that public policy relies on negative obligations in a number of areas. In order to keep Medicaid and Medicare costs down, for example,
policymakers rely on citizens to act responsibly with regard to their health. And to protect the
environment, policymakers rely on households to avoid making unnecessary waste and to avoid
using products harmful to the environment. Kymlicka and Norman, 104 Ethics at 360 (cited in
note 51).
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are meaningfully included in society, tax policy must more explicitly
address both negative and positive responsibilities. 190
Recognizing that the poor have some positive responsibility to
the greater social good does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the state should coerce the poor to contribute their labor in order to
attain full citizenship. A number of possibilities exist for enabling
even the poorest and most disadvantaged individuals to contribute on
a voluntary basis to society. Consider market participation. Judith
Shklar has argued that American citizens have found the marketplace
to be an important aspect of citizenship. The right to earn a living
wage has been integrally linked with independence, freedom, and
status. 191 Market participation has also been viewed as a social and
cultural obligation. Many theorists have argued that individuals have
a duty to avoid dependence as well as a positive duty to contribute as
much as possible to the productive output of society. 192 In short, earning a wage is widely viewed as "a necessary quality of genuine, democratic citizenship."193
Political and economic theorists have begun to recognize the
possibility of using the Federal Tax Code to encourage poor individuals to undertake this social duty. The notion that one has an obligation to work in the waged labor market is reflected in the EITC, as
discussed in Part III. The credit is available to those individuals who
work in the waged labor market, indicating that the right to the credit
is integrally tied to the responsibility to work. 194 In this sense, the
190. This neglect is at once both surprising and predictable. It is surprising in the sense
that taxation is fundamentally about social obligation and thus we should expect any theory of
taxation to address the responsibilities of all citizens. At the same time, many of the moral and
economic theories upon which tax theorists have based their proposed tax reform have also
completely neglected any consideration of social obligation. See Carens, 14 Pol. Theory at 31
(cited in note 92) (noting that moral theorists, including Rawls and Nozick, have failed to
discuss the ethic of social duty); Mead, Beyond Entitlement at 2 (cited in note 14) (noting that
economists have almost uniformly failed to explore the idea of social obligation). Of course, as

my colleague Jack Schlegel points out, the incomplete discussion is not a surprise if traditional
tax theorists are in fact primarily concerned with the rights of the wealthy.
191. Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion 62-101 (Harvard U.,
1991).
192. Although this view is widely associated with the New Right, it is also consistent with

the socialist ideal, "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs:' See
Mead, Beyond Entitlement at 2 (cited in note 14) (arguing society must ask the poor to contribute through workfare programs); Carens, 14 Pol. Theory at 31 (cited in note 92) (arguing that
the socialist ideal, "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his need," reinforces
the idea that citizens have both rights and responsibilities to society).
193. Shklar, American Citizenship at 92-93 (cited in note 191).
194. Alstott, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 536-544 (cited in note 14) (noting that the EITC is intended to support working individuals).
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EITC could be viewed as a tax provision that imposes a positive duty
upon poor individuals and thus embraces a policy that seeks to ensure
the cultural and social integration of the poor into society as valuable
citizens. 195 Indeed, advocates of the policy have applauded the EITC
for just this reason. 196
Although the adoption of the EITC represents an important
advance with regard to recognizing the rights and obligations of the
poor, the provision does nothing to ensure that the poor actually have
the opportunity to participate in the market economy. Indeed, as Ann
Alstott has noted, the program creates unambiguous work disincentives for some individuals. 197 Moreover, the EITC ignores the fact that
many individuals are unable to participate in the market because of
personal responsibilities in the private sphere, lack of education and
training, and the general lack of employment opportunities. 198 In
short, tax theorists have made the market economy, the sphere in
which the poor are least successful, the only site where the poor can
satisfy their positive responsibility to the greater social good. Without
ensuring universal work opportunities, the exclusive focus on the
market imposes a threshold to citizenship that is virtually impossible
for some individuals to meet. 199 It also ignores a variety of other approaches that tax theorists could use to facilitate the satisfaction of
one's responsibility to the state.
Theorists could easily devise a variant of the market-oriented
approach to promote meaningful participation in political and social
195. Mead, Beyond Entitlement at 240 (cited in note 14); Lawrence M. Mead, The New
Politics of Poverty: The Nonworking Poor in America 13 (Basic Books, 1992) (arguing work is
essential to enable the poor to function as citizens).
196. See, for example, Ellwood, Poor Support at 115 (cited in note 117) (asserting that the
EITC helps the working poor to avoid the stigmatizing and degrading welfare system).
197. Alstott, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 549 (cited in note 14). Because the value of the credit
phases out as one's level of income increases, Alstott argues the credit works much like a tax by
reducing the money reward for extra work. Although the tax does not add to the government
fisc, the worker keeps less than a dollar for each additional dollar earned. Consequently, the
structure of the tax may discourage work effort like any other tax by reducing the net wage. Id.
198. Staudt, 84 Geo. L. J. at 1579-92 (cited in note 24) (noting that women's responsibility
for household labor often keeps them from participating in the waged labor market to a
significant degree); Desmond S. King, The New Right: Politics,Markets, and Citizenship 186-91
(MacMllan, 1987) (noting that most individuals on welfare prefer not to be). Indeed, the
emphasis on self-reliance underlying the EITC not only prevents many individuals from
entering mainstream society, it imposes a double bind. For example, if women stay home to
care for their children, they fail to live up to their duty to be self-supporting and if they
participate in the waged labor market they can be accused of failing to live up to their family
responsibilities. Kymlicka and Norman, 104 Ethics at 358 n.9 (cited in note 51).
199. See William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New UrbanPoor
(Knopf, 1996) (arguing that ghetto joblessness promotes serious social, cultural and economic
marginalization which ultimately works to the prevent the poor from achieving full membership
in society and maintains class and racial divisions through society).
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institutions for those who are unable to work in the waged labor market and who have no ability to pay income taxes. Indeed many
political and moral theorists have argued that the responsibilities and
virtues of citizenship are found outside the context of the market.
Michael Walzer has argued, for example, that a democracy is not
necessarily achieved when all citizens work in the market for a wage.
The "civility that makes democratic politics possible," Walzer argues,
"can only be learned in the associational networks" of society.200 Mary
Ann Glendon further argues that it is in community organizations
that "human character, competence, and capacity for citizenship are
formed."201 In lieu of market participation, therefore, theorists could
explore the possibility of tying a tax credit to one's participation in
voluntary organizations found throughout civil society such as a
church, union, ethnic association,202 environmental group, or any other
socially worthwhile organization.
Giving recognition to one's contribution to community organizations is not entirely unfamiliar to traditional tax theorists. The Tax
Code currently recognizes the importance of individual participation
in community-centered activities. Section 170 of the Code, for example, permits a taxpayer to deduct monies donated to a charitable
organization. 203 This charitable deduction, in effect, conveys Walzer's
and Glendon's notion that an individual who has voluntarily contributed to a community organization has satisfied at least part of her
responsibility to the greater good. By allowing the taxpayer to deduct
charitable contributions, the legislature recognizes that one's social
responsibility can be satisfied either by giving to a worthwhile community organization or by giving directly to the government coffers.
While section 170 is valuable for its non-market focus, the poor
are unable to contribute income to a community organization just as
they are unable to carry the burden of income taxation. That only
monetary contributions are tax-deductible, however, reinforces the
idea that the Tax Code is set up to enable the relatively wealthy to
meet their social responsibilities. Congress, however, could expand
200. Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument, in Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of
RadicalDemocracy: Pluralism,Citizenship and Community 104 (Verso, 1992).
201. Glendon, Rights Talk at 106 (cited in note 176).
202. Theorists, however, must not encourage individuals to withdraw from mainstream
society rather than learning how to participate in it. Moreover, theorists must consider the fact
that community organizations might teach tolerance of some authorities and intolerance and
prejudice against others. See Kymlicka and Norman, 104 Ethics at 364 (cited in note 51) (noting
the limitations of Walzer's theory of a participatory democracy).
203. I.R.C. § 170.
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upon the current approach. It could maintain section 170, giving a
deduction to the wealthy, and at the same time amend the provision
to provide a "charitable service credit" that gives a payment to individuals donating services and not income.
Traditional tax theorists will undoubtedly point to administrative difficulties associated with recognizing the value of the services
donated to a charitable organization. Theorists will argue, for example, that the courts and the Internal Revenue Service are unable to
distinguish between activities undertaken for individual pleasure and
those undertaken due to a responsibility to the greater good.
Additionally, because the value of labor is indeterminate, the legisla20 4
ture could not give a credit that accurately reflects its value.
Moreover, it could be argued that by providing a refundable
credit to poor individuals who give their labor to community organizations, the legislature will in effect transform charitable work into
waged labor-which could raise two additional problems. First, asking the poor to undertake a social responsibility to the greater social
good and then paying them for meeting that duty is not really asking
much (in the way that imposing a tax burden is). Second, a refundable tax credit tied to charitable work is essentially publicly funded
employment for all individuals without the possibility of government
oversight and at the same time exacerbating the federal deficit
problem.
A charitable service credit, however, could simply work as an
incentive for individuals to participate in social and political institutions and at the same time give public recognition to their labor as
socially valuable. Accordingly, theorists exploring the possibility of a
charitable service credit need not be concerned with the actual value
of the work or the possibility that the federal government will be a
public employer. The credit should be a small, almost symbolic, payment subject to the same limitations imposed on the EITC.205

204. See, for example, Homes v. Commissioner, 57 R.C. 430 (1971)
The rendering of services does not constitute a proper basis for the allowance of
charitible deductions because, in part, of the administrative problems associated with
verifying and measuring the fair market value of personal service donations, the
disparity in value of personal services among taxpayers, and the question of whether or
not the donor has actually parted with anything of value.
Id. at 435. Traditional tax theorists have exempted the value of household labor from taxation
for the same reasons that services are excluded from section 170. See Staudt, 84 Geo. L. J. at
1577-78 (cited in note 24) (discussing the traditional reasons for exempting the value of women's

household labor).
205. See notes 149-57 and accompanying text (discussing the structure of the EITC). Of

course, seriously considering this type of structural change in the Tax Code would require a
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Moreover, if charitable service is widely perceived to be a valuable
contribution to society as Walzer and Glendon suggest it is, a small
payment would not necessarily offset the gain that inures to society
due to the increased levels of community involvement. The combination of a charitable service credit and the EITC would convey to the
poor that they too have the option to satisfy their obligation to society
in a variety of ways.
Tax theorists could also explore the relationship between education and one's responsibility to participate in a liberal democracy.
Countless theorists have argued that in order to participate effectively, citizens must engage in reasonable public discourse. Such
discourse, however, is not simply the willingness to make one's views
known but also includes "the willingness to listen seriously to a range
of views which, given the diversity of liberal societies will include
ideas the listener is bound to find strange and even obnoxious."

206

Moreover, theorists have argued that publicly and freely discussing
political issues does not entail excessive demands on the state but
rather a reasonable and conscientious debate about one's preferences
and needs. The place to learn the virtue of "public reasonableness,"
according to many political theorists, is through a system of education. 207
Tax theorists, however, have failed to explore the possibility of
using the Tax Code to encourage individuals to meet their social obligation to becoming responsible and deliberative citizens. Under the
current Code, education costs are deductible only if they are associated with the taxpayers' market employment. The deductibility of
employment-related expenses does nothing for individuals who are
unable to participate in the market. Moreover, the current tax subsidy entirely ignores the notion that education is important for reasons far beyond the market. Indeed, the idea that the state could
enable one to become a more informed and publicly spirited citizen
has been entirely rejected. In a well-known case addressing the
deductibility of education costs, for example, an employee of the

much more thorough analysis of these questions. I leave a deeper and more complete analysis
for a later project.
206. William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal
State 227 (Cambridge U., 1991).
207. Suzanna Sherry argues that in order to prepare an individual for responsible and
deliberative citizenship, the individual must learn "moral character, critical thinking, and
cultural literacy (that is, a knowlege of and attachment to their own culture)." Sherry, 62 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 157-207 (cited in note 174).

990

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:919

Chicago Police Department sought to deduct the cost of his English,
Philosophy, History, and Political Science courses. 208 The Chicago
Police Department had an internal policy that encouraged officers to
further their education, recognizing that their close contact with the
community required some level of public reasonableness.
The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also recognized the importance and
value of a college education but nonetheless denied the deduction as
insufficiently related to the officer's current employment.209
If tax theorists and policymakers were committed to the notion
that market activities along with participation in the political process
as well-educated citizens were important to society-at-large, the tax
laws could easily accommodate and encourage these activities.
Educational tax incentives, for example, could be devised in an effort
to push individuals to seek the education necessary to learn the virtue
of public reasonableness. A credit, for example, could be offered in an
effort to reflect the societal value of an individual's time and energy
devoted to educational activities.
Indeed, by recognizing the
value-and the responsibility--of education, tax theorists would
enable both wealthy and poor individuals to satisfy their obligation to
the public good.
Finally, traditional tax theorists' exclusive focus on income
contributions as a way to satisfy one's responsibility to the greater
good not only works to marginalize the poor, but might work to the
detriment of wealthy individuals.
Expanding citizens' social
obligations beyond paying taxes would not only be more inclusive of
the poor, but as Richard Pildes has argued, it would prevent the
wealthy from escaping direct involvement in social and political
institutions.2 10 Pildes points to the manner in which the relatively
wealthy express their responsibility to the welfare state. He notes
that "payment of taxes is surely better than earlier Social Darwinist
approaches to the poor, but it allows most citizens to escape the
meaning and effects of direct involvement with their needs." 211 Pildes
argues that by simply paying for welfare, wealthy citizens not only
break ties with whole communities, but also encourage impersonal
federal programs to replace community organizations. In his view, if
the system were reconstituted to encourage widespread and direct
participation through the devotion of time and energy, the welfare

208.
209.
210.
211.

Carrol v. Commissioner,418 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1969).
Id.
Pildes, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 952-54 (cited in note 184).
Id. at 952.
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state might be far more effective while at the same time encouraging
22
stronger and more worthwhile social relationships. 1
V. CONCLUSION
Traditional tax theorists are deeply divided on the legitimacy
of the progressive marginal tax rates. In defending their views on
progressivity, tax scholars have relied upon an extremely diverse set
of principles including early social contract theory, welfarist theories
of distributional justice, and entitlement theories of property. These
theories have led traditional tax scholars to propose a variety of
marginal tax rate structures ranging from the steeply progressive to
the steeply regressive. Hidden within the debate over the fairness,
however, is a surprising consensus on the proper treatment of the
truly poor. Scholars on all sides of the debate have argued that the
state should exempt the poor from any obligation to contribute to the
greater social good.
Although the exemption from taxation is perhaps an obvious
policy choice given the economic constraints of the poor, the widespread agreement has caused tax theorists to focus almost exclusively
upon the rights and responsibilities of the relatively wealthy.
Theorists have failed to explore fully the extent to which poor individuals might have a positive claim to income or, indeed, a positive
obligation to the greater social good. This Article has argued that
traditional tax theorists must give a more careful consideration to the
positive rights and responsibilities of all individuals, both wealthy
and poor. A more complete analysis of these issues will not only
subject the goals and aims of traditional tax theory and policymaking
to serious deliberation, but it will also avoid the hidden costs and
constraints associated with the current approach to taxation.

212. Id.

